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Preface
This short book contains my lecture notes for the ﬁrst quarter of a
microeconomics course for PhD or Master’s degree economics stu-
dents. The lecture notes were developed over a period of almost 15
years during which I taught the course, or parts of it, at Tel Aviv,
Princeton, and New York universities.
I am publishing the lecture notes with some hesitation. Several
superb books are already on the shelves. I most admire Kreps (1990),
which pioneered the transformation of the game theoretic revolu-
tion in economic theory from research papers into textbooks. His
book covers the material in depth and includes many ideas for fu-
ture research. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) continued
this trend with a very comprehensive and detailed textbook. There
are three other books on my short list: Bowles (2003), which brings
economicsbacktoitsauthentic, politicaleconomicsroots; Jehleand
Reny(1997), withitsveryprecisestyle; andtheclassicVarian(1984).
These ﬁve books constitute an impressive collection of textbooks for
the standard advanced microeconomics course.
My book covers only the ﬁrst quarter of the standard course. It
does not aim to compete but to supplement these books. I had it
published only because I think that some of the didactic ideas in the
book might be beneﬁcial to students and teachers, and it is to this
end that I insisted on retaining the lecture notes style.
Throughout the book I use only male pronouns. This is my de-
liberate choice and does not reﬂect the policy of the editors or the
publishers. I believe that continuous reminders of the he/she issue
simply divert readers’ attention. Language is of course very impor-
tant in shaping our thinking and I don’t dispute the importance of
the type of language we use. But I feel it is more effective to raise the
issue of discrimination against women in the discussion of gender-
related issues, rather than raising ﬂags on every page of a book on
economic theory.
AspecialfeatureofthisbookisthatitisalsopostedontheInternet
and access is entirely free. My intention is to update the book annu-
ally (or at least in years when I teach the course). To access the latestOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 10 Page number viii
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electronic version of the book, visit: http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/
micro1/.
I would like to thank all my teaching assistants, who contributed
comments during the many years I taught the course: Rani Spiegler,
Kﬁr Eliaz, Yoram Hamo, Gabi Gayer and Tamir Tshuva at Tel Aviv
University; Bilge Yilmiz, Ronny Razin, Wojciech Olszewski, Attila
Ambrus, Andrea Wilson, Haluk Ergin and Daisuke Nakajima at
Princeton; andSophieBadeandAnnaIngsteratNYU.Specialthanks
are due to Sharon Simmer and Raﬁ Aviav who helped me with the
English editing and to Gabi Gayer and Daniel Wasserteil who pre-
pared the ﬁgures.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 11 Page number ix
Introduction
As a new graduate student, you are at the beginning of a new stage
of your life. In a few months you will be overloaded with deﬁ-
nitions, concepts, and models. Your teachers will be guiding you
into the wonders of economics and will rarely have the time to stop
to raise fundamental questions about what these models are sup-
posed to mean. It is not unlikely that you will be brainwashed by
the professional-sounding language and hidden assumptions. I am
afraid I am about to initiate you into this inevitable process. Still, I
want to use this opportunity to pause for a moment and alert you
to the fact that many economists have strong and conﬂicting views
about what economic theory is. Some see it as a set of theories that
can (or should) be tested. Others see it as a bag of tools to be used
by economic agents, and yet others see it as a framework through
which professional and academic economists view the world.
My own view may disappoint those of you who have come to
this course with practical motivations. In my view, economic the-
ory is no more than an arena for the investigation of concepts we use
in thinking about economics in real life. What makes a theoretical
model “economics” is that the concepts we are analyzing are taken
from real-life reasoning about economic issues. Through the inves-
tigation of these concepts we indeed try to understand reality better,
and the models provide a language that enables us to think about
economic interactions in a systematic way. But I do not view eco-
nomic models as an attempt to describe the world or to provide tools
for predicting the future. I object to looking for an ultimate truth
in economic theory, and I do not expect it to be the foundation for
any policy recommendation. Nothing is “holy” in economic theory
and everything is the creation of people like yourself.
Basically, this course is about a certain class of economic concepts
andmodels. Althoughwewillbestudyingformalconceptsandmod-
els, they will always be given an interpretation. An economic model
differs substantially from a purely mathematical model in that it is
a combination of a mathematical model and its interpretation. The
names of the mathematical objects are an integral part of an eco-
nomic model. When mathematicians use terms such as “ﬁeld” orOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 12 Page number x
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“ring” which are in everyday use, it is only for the sake of conve-
nience. When they name a collection of sets a “ﬁlter,” they are
doing so in an associative manner; in principle, they could call it
“ice cream cone.” When they use the term “good ordering” they
are not making an ethical judgment. In contrast to mathematics,
interpretation is an essential ingredient of any economic model.
It is my hope that some of you will react and attempt to change
what is currently called economic theory, and that some of you will
acquire alternative ways of thinking about economic and social in-
teractions. At the very least, the course should teach you to ask hard
questions about economic models and in what sense they are rele-
vant to the economic questions we are interested in. I hope that you
walk away from this course with the recognition that the answers
are not as obvious as they might appear.
Microeconomics
In this course we deal only with microeconomics, a collection of
models in which the primitives are details about the behavior of
units called economic agents. Microeconomic models investigate as-
sumptions about economic agents’ activities and about interactions
between these agents. An economic agent is the basic unit operat-
ing in the model. Most often, we do have in mind that the eco-
nomic agent is an individual, a person with one head, one heart,
two eyes, and two ears. However, in some economic models, an
economic agent is taken to be a nation, a family, or a parliament.
At other times, the “individual” is broken down into a collection of
economic agents, each operating in distinct circumstances and each
regarded as an economic agent.
We should not be too cheerful about the statement that an eco-
nomic agent in microeconomics is not constrained to being an in-
dividual. The facade of generality in economic theory might be
misleading. We have to be careful and aware that when we take
an economic agent to be a group of individuals, the reasonable as-
sumptions we might impose on it are distinct from those we might
want to impose on a single individual. In any case, with a particu-
lar economic scenario in mind, the decision about how to think of
that scenario in the framework of a microeconomic model involves
a decision about whom we want to view as the primitives.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 13 Page number xi
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An economic agent is described in our models as a unit that re-
sponds to a scenario called a choice problem, where the agent must
make a choice from a set of available alternatives. The economic
agentappearsinthemicroeconomicmodelwithaspeciﬁeddelibera-
tionprocessheusestomakeadecision. Inmostofcurrenteconomic
theory, the deliberation process is what is called rational choice. The
agent decides what action to take through a process in which he
1. asks himself “What is desirable?”
2. asks himself “What is feasible?”
3. chooses the most desirable from among the feasible alterna-
tives.
Rationality in economics does not contain judgments about de-
sires. A rational agent can have preferences which the entire world
views as being against the agent’s interest. Furthermore, economists
are fully aware that almost all people, almost all the time, do not
practice this kind of deliberation.
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd the investigation of economic agents who
follow the rational process to be important, since we often refer
to rational decision making in life as an ideal process. It is mean-
ingful to talk about the concept of “being good” even in a society
where all people are evil; similarly, it is meaningful to talk about
the concept of a “rational man” and about the interactions between
rational economic agents even if all people systematically behave in
a nonrational manner.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 14 Page number xiiOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 15 Page number xiii
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Although we are on our way to constructing a model of rational
choice, we begin the course with an “exercise”: formulating the no-
tion of “preferences” independently of the concept of choice. We
view preferences as the mental attitude of an individual (economic
agent) toward alternatives.We seek to develop a “proper” formaliza-
tion of this concept, which plays such a central role in economics.
Imaginethatyouwanttofullydescribethepreferencesofanagent
toward the elements in a given set X. For example, imagine that
you want to describe your own attitude toward the universities you
apply to before ﬁnding out to which of them you have been admit-
ted. What must the description include? What conditions must the
description fulﬁll?
We take the approach that a description of preferences should
fully specify the attitude of the agent toward each pair of elements
in X. For each pair of alternatives, it should provide an answer to
the question of how the agent compares the two alternatives. We
present two versions of this question. For each version we formu-
late the consistency requirements necessary to make the responses
“preferences” and examine the connection between the two formal-
izations.
The Questionnaire Q
Let us think about the preferences on a set X as answers to a “long”
questionnaire Q which consists of all quiz questions of the type:October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 18 Page number 2
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Q(x,y) (for all distinct x and y in X)
How do you compare x and y? Tick one and only one of the
following three options:
 I prefer x to y (this answer is denoted as x   y).
 I prefer y to x (this answer is denoted by y   x).
 I am indifferent (this answer is denoted by I).
A “legal” answer to the questionnaire is a response in which the
respondent ticks exactly one of the boxes in each question. We do
not allow the decision maker to refrain from answering a question
or to tick more than one answer. Furthermore, we do not allow
him to respond with answers that demonstrate a lack of ability to
compare, such as:
 They are incomparable.
 I don’t know what x is.
 I have no opinion.
Or a dependence on other factors such as:
 It depends on what my parents think.
 It depends on the circumstances (sometimes I prefer x but usu-
ally I prefer y).
Or the intensity of preferences such as:
 I somewhat prefer x.
 I love x and I hate y.
Or confusion such as:
 I both prefer x over y and y over x.
 I can’t concentrate right now.
The constraints that we place on the legal responses of the agents
constitute our implicit assumptions. Particularly important are the
assumptions that the elements in the set X are all comparable, that
the individual has an opinion about all elements in the set X and
that we do not allow him to specify the intensity of preferences.
A legal answer to the questionnaire can be formulated as a func-
tion f which assigns to any pair (x,y) of distinct elements in X
exactly one of the three “values”: x   y or y   x or I, with the inter-
pretation that f (x,y) is the answer to the question Q(x,y). (Alterna-
tively, we can use the terminology of the soccer “betting” industry
and say that f (x,y) must be 1, 2, or × with the interpretation thatOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 19 Page number 3
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f (x,y) = 1 means that x is better than y, f (x,y) = 2 means that y is
better than x and f (x,y) =×means indifference.)
Not all legal answers to the questionnaire Q qualify as preferences
over the set X. We will adopt two “consistency” restrictions:
First, the answer to Q(x,y) must be identical to the answer to
Q(y,x). In other words, we want to exclude the common “framing
effect” by which people who are asked to compare two alternatives
tend to prefer the “ﬁrst” one.
Second, werequirethattheanswersexhibit“transitivity.”Inother
words, the answers to Q(x,y) and Q(y,z) must be consistent with the
answer to Q(x,z) in the following sense: If “x is preferred to y” and
“y is preferred to z” then “x is preferred to z,” and if the answers to
the two questions Q(x,y) and Q(y,z) are “indifference” then so is
the answer to Q(x,z).
To summarize, here is my favorite formalization of the notion of
preferences:
Deﬁnition 1
Preferences on a set X are a function f that assigns to any pair (x,y)
of distinct elements in X exactly one of the three “values” x   y,
y   x or I so that for any three different elements x, y and z in X,
the following two properties hold:
• No order effect: f (x,y) = f (y,x).
• Transitivity:
if f (x,y) = x   y and f (y,z) = y   z then f (x,z) = x   z and
if f (x,y) = I and f (y,z) = I then f (x,z) = I.
NoteagainthatI, x   y, andy   xaremerelysymbolsrepresenting
verbal answers. Needless to say, the choice of symbols is not an
arbitrary one. (Why do I use the notation I and not x ∼ y?)
A Discussion of Transitivity
The transitivity property is an appealing property of preferences.
How would you react if somebody told you he prefers x to y, y to z
and z to x? You would probably feel that his answers are “confused.”
Furthermore, it seems that, when confronted with an intransitivityOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 20 Page number 4
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in their responses, people are embarrassed and want to change their
answers.
Before the lecture, students in Tel Aviv had to ﬁll out a question-
naire similar to Q regarding a set X that contains nine alternatives,
each specifying the following four characteristics of a travel pack-
age: location (Paris or Rome), price, quality of the food, and quality
of the lodgings. The questionnaire included only thirty six ques-
tions since for each pair of alternatives x and y, only one of the
questions, Q(x,y) or Q(y,x), was randomly selected to appear in the
questionnaire (thus the dependence on order of an individual’s re-
sponse could not be checked within the experimental framework).
In the 2004 group, out of eighteen MA students, only two had no
intransitivities in their answers, and the average number of triples
in which intransitivity existed was almost nine. Many of the viola-
tions of transitivity involved two alternatives that were actually the
same, but differed in the order in which the characteristics appeared
in the description. “A weekend in Paris at a four-star hotel with food
quality Zagat 17 for $574,” and “A weekend in Paris for $574 with
food quality Zagat 17 at a four-star hotel.” All students expressed
indifference between the two alternatives, but in a comparison of
these two alternatives to a third alternative—“A weekend in Rome
at a ﬁve-star hotel with food quality Zagat 18 for $612”—half of the
students gave responses that violated transitivity.
In spite of the appeal of the transitivity requirement, note that
when we assume that the attitude of an individual toward pairs of
alternativesistransitive, weareexcludingindividualswhobasetheir
judgments on “procedures” that cause systematic violations of tran-
sitivity. The following are two such examples.
1. Aggregation of considerations as a source of intransitivity. In some
cases, an individual’s attitude is derived from the aggregation of
more basic considerations. Consider, for example, a case where
X ={ a,b,c} and the individual has three primitive considerations
in mind. The individual ﬁnds one alternative better than the
other if a majority of considerations support the ﬁrst alterna-
tive. This aggregation process can yield intransitivities. For ex-
ample, ifthethreeconsiderationsrankthealternativesasfollows:
a  1 b  1 c, b  2 c  2 a and c  3 a  3 b, then the individual de-
termines a to be preferred over b, b over c, and c over a, thus
violating transitivity.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 21 Page number 5
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2. The use of similarities as an obstacle to transitivity. In some cases,
the decision maker expresses indifference in a comparison be-
tweentwoelementsthataretoo“close”tobedistinguishable. For
example, let X = (the set of real numbers). Consider an indi-
vidual whose attitude is “the more the better”; however, he ﬁnds
it impossible to determine whether a is greater than b unless the
difference is at least 1. He will assign f (x,y) = x   y if x ≥ y − 1
and f (x,y) = I if |x − y| < 1. This is not a preference relation
since 1.5 ∼ 0.8 and 0.8 ∼ 0.3, but it is not true that 1.5 ∼ 0.3.
Did we require too little? Another potential criticism of our deﬁni-
tion is that our assumptions might have been too weak and that we
did not impose some reasonable further restrictions on the concept
of preferences. That is, there are other similar consistency require-
ments we may impose on a legal response to qualify it as a descrip-
tion of preferences. For example, if f (x,y) = x   y and f (y,z) = I,
we would naturally expect that f (x,z) = x   z. However, this ad-
ditional consistency condition was not included in the above def-
inition since it follows from the other conditions: If f (x,z) = I,
then by the assumption that f (y,z) = I and by the no order
effect, f (z,y) = I, and thus by transitivity f (x,y) = I (a contra-
diction). Alternatively, if f (x,z) = z   x, then by no order effect
f (z,x) = z   x, and by f (x,y) = x   y and transitivity f (z,y) = z   y
(a contradiction).
Similarly, note that for any preferences f , we have if f (x,y) = I
and f (y,z) = y   z, then f (x,z) = x   z.
The Questionnaire R
A second way to think about preferences is through an imaginary
questionnaire R consisting of all questions of the type:
R(x,y) (for all x,y ∈ X, not necessarily distinct).
“Is x at least as preferred as y?” Tick one and only one of the
following two options:
 Yes
 NoOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 22 Page number 6
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By a “legal” response we mean that the respondent ticks exactly
one of the boxes in each question. To qualify as preferences a legal
response must also satisfy two conditions:
1. The answer to at least one of the questions R(x,y) and R(y,x)
must be Yes. (In particular, the “silly” question R(x,x) which
appears in the questionnaire must get a Yes response.)
2. For every x,y,z ∈ X, if the answers to the questions R(x,y) and
R(y,z) are Yes, then so is the answer to the question R(x,z).
We identify a response to this questionnaire with the binary rela-
tion  on the set X deﬁned by x  y if the answer to the question
R(x,y) is Yes.
(Reminder:A n n-ary relation on X is a subset of Xn. Examples:
“Being a parent of” is a binary relation on the set of human beings;
“being a hat” is an unary relation on the set of objects; “x + y = z”i s
a 3-nary relation on the set of numbers; “x is better than y more than
x  is better than y ” is 4-nary relation on a set of alternatives, etc. An
n-ary relation on X can be thought of as a response to a questionnaire
regarding all n-tuples of elements of X where each question can get
only a Yes/No answer.)
This brings us to the “traditional” deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2
A preference on a set X is a binary relation  on X satisfying:
• Completeness: For any x,y∈X, x  y or y  x.
• Transitivity: For any x,y,z∈X,i fx  y and y  z, then x  z.
The Equivalence of the Two Deﬁnitions
We have presented two deﬁnitions of preferences on the set X.W e
now proceed to show their equivalence. There are many ways to
construct “a one-to-one correspondence” between the objects satis-
fyingthetwodeﬁnitions. But, whenwethinkabouttheequivalence
of two deﬁnitions in economics we are thinking about much more
than the existence of a one-to-one correspondence: the correspon-
dence has to preserve the interpretation. Note the similarity to the
notion of an isomorphism in mathematics. For example, an iso-
morphism between two topological spaces X and Y is a one-to-oneOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 23 Page number 7
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Table 1.1
A response to Q(x,y) and Q(y,x) A response to R(x,y) and R(y,x)
x   y Yes, No
I Yes, Yes
y   x No, Yes
function from X onto Y that is required to preserve the open sets. In
economics, the one-to-one correspondence is required to preserve
the more informal concept of interpretation.
We will now construct a one-to-one and onto correspondence,
Translation, between answers to Q that qualify as preferences by
the ﬁrst deﬁnition and answers to R that qualify as preferences by
the second deﬁnition, such that the correspondence preserves the
meaning of the responses to the two questionnaires. In other words,
Translation is a “bridge” between the responses to Q that qualify as
preferences and the responses to R that qualify as preferences.
Toillustratethecorrespondenceimaginethatyouhavetwobooks.
EachpageintheﬁrstbookisaresponsetothequestionnaireQ which
qualiﬁes as preferences by the ﬁrst deﬁnition. Each page in the sec-
ond book is a response to the questionnaire R which qualiﬁes as
preferences by the second deﬁnition. The correspondence matches
each page in the ﬁrst book with a unique page in the second book, so
that a reasonable person will recognize that the different responses
to the two questionnaires reﬂect the same mental attitudes towards
the alternatives.
Since we assume that the answers to all questions of the type
R(x,x) are “Yes,” the classiﬁcation of a response to R as a preference
only requires the speciﬁcation of the answers to questions R(x,y),
where x  = y. Table 1.1 presents the translation of responses.
This translation preserves the interpretation we have given to the
responses, that is, “I prefer x to y” has the same meaning as the
statement “I ﬁnd x to be at least as good as y, but I don’t ﬁnd y to
be at least as good as x.”
The following observations complete the proof that Translation
is indeed a one-to-one correspondence from the set of preferences,
as given by deﬁnition 1, onto the set of preferences as given by
deﬁnition 2.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 24 Page number 8
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By the assumption on Q of a no order effect, for any two alterna-
tives x and y, one and only one of the following three answers was
received for both Q(x,y) and Q(y,x): x   y, I and y   x. Thus, the
responses to R(x,y) and R(y,x) are well deﬁned.
Next we verify that the response to R that we have constructed
with the table is indeed a preference relation (by the second deﬁni-
tion).
Completeness: In each of the three rows, the answers to at least
one of the questions R(x,y) and R(y,x) is afﬁrmative.
Transitivity: Assume that the answers to R(x,y) and R(y,z) are
afﬁrmative. This implies that the answer to Q(x,y) is either x   y
or I, and the answer to Q(y,z) is either y   z or I. Transitivity of Q
implies that the answer to Q(x,z) must be x   z or I, and therefore
the answer to R(x,z) must be afﬁrmative.
To see that Translation is indeed a one-to-one correspondence,
note that for any two different responses to the questionnaire Q
theremustbeaquestionQ(x,y)forwhichtheresponsesdiffer; there-
fore, the corresponding responses to either R(x,y) or R(y,x) must
differ.
It remains to be shown that the range of the Translation function
includes all possible preferences as deﬁned by the second deﬁnition.
Let  be preferences in the traditional sense (a response to R). We
have to specify a function f , a response to Q, which is converted by
Translation to . Read from right to left, the table provides us with
such a function f .
By the completeness of , for any two elements x and y, one of the
entries in the right-hand column is applicable (the fourth option,
that the two answers to R(x,y) and R(y,x) are “No,” is excluded),
and thus the response to Q is well deﬁned and by deﬁnition satisﬁes
no order effect.
We still have to check that f satisﬁes the transitivity condition.
If F(x,y) = x   y and F(y,z) = y   z, then x  y and not y  x and
y  z and not z  y. By transitivity of , x  z. In addition, not
z  x since if z  x, then the transitivity of  would imply z  y.
If F(x,y) = I and F(y,z) = I, then x  y, y  x, y  z and z  y.B y
transitivity of , both x  z and z  x, and thus F(x,z) = I.
Summary
From now on we will use the second deﬁnition, that is, a preference
on X is a binary relation  on a set X satisfying Completeness andOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 25 Page number 9
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Transitivity. For a preference relation , we will use the notation
x ∼ y when both x  y and y  x; the notation x   y will stand for
if x  y and not y  x.
Bibliographic Notes
Recommended readings: Kreps 1990, 17–24; Mas-Colell et al. 1995,
chapter 1, A–B.
Fishburn (1970) contains a comprehensive treatment of prefer-
ence relations.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 26 Page number 10
Problem Set 1
Problem 1. (Easy)
Let  be a preference relation on a set X. Deﬁne I(x) to be the set of all y ∈ X
for which y ∼ x.
Show that the set (of sets!) {I(x)|x ∈ X} is a partition of X, i.e.,
• For all x and y, either I(x) = I(y) or I(x) ∩ I(y) =∅ .
• For every x ∈ X, there is y ∈ X such that x ∈ I(y).
Problem 2. (Standard)
Kreps(1990)introducesanotherformaldeﬁnitionforpreferences. Hisprim-
itive is a binary relation P interpreted as “strictly preferred.” He requires P
to satisfy:
• Asymmetry: For no x and y do we have both xPy and yPx.
• Negative-Transitivity: For all x, y, and z ∈ X,i fxPy, then for any z either
xPz or zPy (or both).
Explain the sense in which Kreps’ formalization is equivalent to the tra-
ditional deﬁnition.
Problem 3. (Standard)
In economic theory we are often interested in other types of binary rela-
tions, for example, the relation xSy:“ x and y are almost the same.” Suggest
properties that would correspond to your intuition about such a concept.
Problem 4. (Difﬁcult. Based on Kannai and Peleg 1984.)
Let Z be a ﬁnite set and let X be the set of all nonempty subsets of Z. Let 
be a preference relation on X (not Z).
Consider the following two properties of preference relations on X:
a. If A  B and C is a set disjoint to both A and B, then A ∪ C  B ∪ C,
and
if A   B and C is a set disjoint to both A and B, then A ∪ C   B ∪ C.
b. If x ∈ Z and {x} { y} for all y ∈ A, then A ∪{ x} A, and
if x ∈ Z and {y} { x} for all y ∈ A, then A   A ∪{ x}.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 27 Page number 11
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Discuss the plausibility of the properties in the context of interpreting
 as the attitude of the individual toward sets from which he will have to
make a choice at a “second stage.”
Provide an example of a preference relation that
• Satisﬁes the two properties.
• Satisﬁes the ﬁrst but not the second property.
• Satisﬁes the second but not the ﬁrst property.
Show that if there are x,y, and z ∈ Z such that {x} { y} { z}, then there
is no preferene relation satisfying both properties.
Problem 5. (Fun)
Listen to the illusion called the Shepard Scale. (Currently, it is avail-
able at http://www.sandlotscience.com/Ambiguous/ShpTones1.htm and
http://asa.aip.org/demo27.html.)
Can you think of any economic analogies?October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 28 Page number 12
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Utility
The Concept of Utility Representation
Think of examples of preferences. In the case of a small number of
alternatives, we often describe a preference relation as a list arranged
from best to worst. In some cases, the alternatives are grouped into
a small number of categories and we describe the preferences on X
by specifying the preferences on the set of categories. But, in my
experience, most of the examples that come to mind are similar to:
“I prefer the taller basketball player,” “I prefer the more expensive
present,” “I prefer a teacher who gives higher grades,” “I prefer the
person who weighs less.”
Common to all these examples is that they can naturally be spec-
iﬁed by a statement of the form “x  y if V(x) ≥ V(y)” (or V(x) ≤
V(y)), where V : X → is a function that attaches a real number to
each element in the set of alternatives X. For example, the prefer-
encesstatedby“Ipreferthetallerbasketballplayer”canbeexpressed
formally by: X is the set of all conceivable basketball players, and
V(x) is the height of player x.
Note that the statement x  y if V(x) ≥ V(y) always deﬁnes a pref-
erence relation since the relation ≥ on   satisﬁes completeness and
transitivity.
Even when the description of a preference relation does not in-
volve a numerical evaluation, we are interested in an equivalent nu-
merical representation. We say that the function U : X → represents
the preference  if for all x and y ∈ X, x  y if and only if U(x) ≥ U(y).
If the function U represents the preference relation , we refer to it
as a utility function and we say that  has a utility representation.
It is possible to avoid the notion of a utility representation and
to “do economics” with the notion of preferences. Nevertheless, we
usuallyuseutilityfunctionsratherthanpreferencesasameansofde-
scribing an economic agent’s attitude toward alternatives, probablyOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 29 Page number 13
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because we ﬁnd it more convenient to talk about the maximization
of a numerical function than of a preference relation.
Note that when deﬁning a preference relation using a utility func-
tion, the function has an intuitive meaning that carries with it addi-
tional information. In contrast, when the utility function is formed
in order to represent an existing preference relation, the utility func-
tion has no meaning other than that of representing a preference
relation. Absolute numbers are meaningless in the latter case; only
relative order has meaning. Indeed, if a preference relation has a
utility representation, then it has an inﬁnite number of such repre-
sentations, as the following simple claim shows:
Claim:
IfU represents, thenforanystrictlyincreasingfunctionf : →  ,
the function V(x) = f (U(x)) represents  as well.
Proof:
a  b
iff U(a) ≥ U(b) (since U represents )
iff f (U(a)) ≥ f (U(b)) (since f is strictly increasing)
iff V(a) ≥ V(b).
Existence of a Utility Representation
If any preference relation could be represented by a utility function,
then it would “grant a license” to use utility functions rather than
preference relations with no loss of generality. Utility theory inves-
tigates the possibility of using a numerical function to represent a
preference relation and the possibility of numerical representations
carrying additional meanings (such as, a is preferred to b more than
c is preferred to d).
We will now examine the basic question of “utility theory”: Under
what assumptions do utility representations exist?
Our ﬁrst observation is quite trivial. When the set X is ﬁnite,
there is always a utility representation. The detailed proof is pre-
sented here mainly to get into the habit of analytical precision. WeOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 30 Page number 14
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start with a lemma regarding the existence of minimal elements (an
element a ∈ X is minimal if a  x for any x ∈ X).
Lemma:
In any ﬁnite set A ⊆ X there is a minimal element (similarly, there
is also a maximal element).
Proof:
By induction on the size of A.I fA is a singleton, then by complete-
ness its only element is minimal.
For the inductive step, let A be of cardinality n + 1 and let x ∈ A.
The set A−{x} is of cardinality n and by the inductive assumption
has a minimal element denoted by y.I fx  y, then y is minimal in
A.I fy  x, then by transitivity z  x for all z ∈ A−{x} and thus x is
minimal.
Claim:
If  is a preference relation on a ﬁnite set X, then  has a utility
representation with values being natural numbers.
Proof:
We will construct a sequence of sets inductively. Let X1 be the sub-
set of elements that are minimal in X. By the above lemma, X1
is not empty. Assume we have constructed the sets X1,...,Xk.I f
X = X1 ∪ X2 ∪ ...∪ Xk we are done. If not, deﬁne Xk+1 to be the
set of minimal elements in X − X1 − X2 −···−Xk. By the lemma
Xk+1  =∅ . Since X is ﬁnite we must be done after at most |X| steps.
Deﬁne U(x) = k if x ∈ Xk. Thus, U(x) is the step number at which
x is “eliminated.” To verify that U represents , let a  b. Then
b / ∈ X − X1 − X2 −···−XU(a) and thus U(a) ≥ U(b).
Without any further assumptions on the preferences, the exis-
tence of a utility representation is guaranteed when the set X isOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 31 Page number 15
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countable (recall that X is countable and inﬁnite if there is a one-to-
one function from the natural numbers to X, namely, it is possible
to specify an enumeration of all its members {xn}n=1,2,...).
Claim:
If X is countable, then any preference relation on X has a utility
representation with a range (−1,1).
Proof:
Let {xn} be an enumeration of all elements in X. We will construct
the utility function inductively. Set U(x1) = 0. Assume that you
have completed the deﬁnition of the values U(x1),...,U(xn−1) so
that xk  xl iff U(xk) ≥ U(xl).I f xn is indifferent to xk for some
k < n, then assign U(xn) = U(xk). If not, by transitivity, all num-
bers in the set {U(xk)| xk ≺ xn}∪{ − 1} are below all numbers in the
set {U(xk)| xn ≺ xk}∪{ 1}. Choose U(xn) to be between the two sets.
This guarantees that for any k < n we have xn  xk iff U(xn) ≥ U(xk).
Thus, the function we deﬁned on {x1,...,xn} represents the prefer-
ence on those elements.
To complete the proof that U represents , take any two elements,
x and y ∈ X. For some k and l we have x = xk and y = xl. The above
applied to n = max{k,l} yields xk  xl iff U(xk) ≥ U(xl).
Lexicographic Preferences
Lexicographic preferences are the outcome of applying the follow-
ing procedure for determining the ranking of any two elements in a
set X. The individual has in mind a sequence of criteria that could
be used to compare pairs of elements in X. The criteria are applied in
a ﬁxed order until a criterion is reached that succeeds in distinguish-
ing between the two elements, in that it determines the preferred
alternative. Formally, let (k)k=1,...,K be a K-tuple of orderings over
the set X. The lexicographic ordering induced by those orderings is
deﬁned by x L y if (1) there is k∗ such that for all k < k∗ we have
x ∼k y and x  k∗ y or (2) x ∼k y for all k. Verify that L is a preference
relation.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 32 Page number 16
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Example:
Let X be the unit square, i.e., X =[ 0,1]×[ 0,1]. Let x k y if xk ≥ yk.
ThelexicographicorderingL inducedfrom1 and2 is: (a1,a2) L
(b1,b2)ifa1 > b1 orbotha1 = b1 anda2 ≥ b2. (Thus, inthisexample,
the left component is the primary criterion while the right compo-
nent is the secondary criterion.)
We will now show that the preferences L do not have a utility
representation. The lack of a utility representation excludes lexico-
graphic preferences from the scope of standard economic models in
spite of the fact that they constitute a simple and commonly used
procedure for preference formation.
Claim:
The preference relation L on [0,1]×[ 0,1], which is induced from
the relations x k y if xk ≥ yk (k = 1,2), does not have a utility rep-
resentation.
Proof:
Assume by contradiction that the function u : X → represents L.
For any a ∈[ 0,1], (a,1)  L (a,0) we thus have u(a,1)>u(a,0). Let
q(a) be a rational number in the nonempty interval Ia = (u(a,0),
u(a,1)). The function q is a function from X into the set of ra-
tional numbers. It is a one-to-one function since if b > a then
(b,0)  L (a,1) and therefore u(b,0)>u(a,1). It follows that the in-
tervals Ia and Ib are disjoint and thus q(a)  = q(b). But the cardinality
of the rational numbers is lower than that of the continuum, a con-
tradiction.
Continuity of Preferences
In economics we often take the set X to be an inﬁnite subset of a
Euclidean space. The following is a condition that will guarantee
the existence of a utility representation in such a case. The basic in-
tuition, captured by the notion of a continuous preference relation,October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 33 Page number 17
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Figure 2.1
Two deﬁnitions of continuity of preferences.
is that if a is preferred to b, then “small” deviations from a or from
b will not reverse the ordering.
Deﬁnition C1:
ApreferencerelationonX iscontinuousifwhenevera   b (namely,
it is not true that b  a), there are neighborhoods (balls) Ba and Bb
around a and b, respectively, such that for all x ∈ Ba and y ∈ Bb, x   y
(namely, it is not true that y  x). (See ﬁg. 2.1.)
Deﬁnition C2:
A preference relation  on X is continuous if the graph of  (that
is, the set {(x,y)|x  y}⊆X × X) is a closed set (with the product
topology); that is, if {(an,bn)} is a sequence of pairs of elements in X
satisfying an  bn for all n and an → a and bn → b, then a  b. (See
ﬁg. 2.1.)
Claim:
The preference relation  on X satisﬁes C1 if and only if it satisﬁes
C2.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 34 Page number 18
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Proof:
Assume that  on X is continuous according to C1. Let {(an,bn)}
be a sequence of pairs satisfying an  bn for all n and an → a and
bn → b. If it is not true that a  b (that is, b   a), then there exist
two balls Ba and Bb around a and b, respectively, such that for all
y ∈ Bb and x ∈ Ba, y   x. There is an N large enough such that for all
n > N, both bn ∈ Bb and an ∈ Ba. Therefore, for all n > N, we have
bn   an, which is a contradiction.
Assume that  is continuous according to C2. Let a   b. Denote
by B(x,r) the set of all elements in X distanced less than r from x.
Assume by contradiction that for all n there exist an ∈ B(a,1/n) and
bn ∈ B(b,1/n) such that bn  an. The sequence (bn,an) converges to
(b,a); by the second deﬁnition (b,a) is within the graph of  , that
is, b  a, which is a contradiction.
Remarks
1. If  on X is represented by a continuous function U, then  is
continuous. To see this, note that if a   b then U(a)>U(b). Let
ε = (U(a) − U(b))/2. By the continuity of U, there is a δ>0 such
that for all x distanced less than δ from a, U(x)>U(a) − ε, and
for all y distanced less than δ from b, U(y)<U(b) + ε. Thus, for
x and y within the balls of radius δ around a and b, respectively,
x   y.
2. The lexicographic preferences which were used in the counterex-
ample to the existence of a utility representation are not contin-
uous. This is because (1,1)   (1,0), but in any ball around (1,1)
there are points inferior to (1,0).
3. Note that the second deﬁnition of continuity can be applied to
any binary relation over a topological space, not just to a prefer-
ence relation. For example, the relation = on the real numbers
( 1) is continuous while the relation  = is not.
Debreu’s Theorem
Debreu’s theorem, which states that continuous preferences have
a continuous utility representation, is one of the classic results inOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 35 Page number 19
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economic theory. For a complete proof of Debreu’s theorem see
Debreu 1954, 1960. Here we prove only that continuity guarantees
the existence of a utility representation.
Lemma:
If  is a continuous preference relation on a convex set X ⊆  n, and
if x   y, then there exists z in X such that x   z   y.
Proof:
Assume not. Construct a sequence of points on the interval that
connects the points x and y in the following way. First deﬁne x0 = x
and y0 = y. In the inductive step we have two points, xt and yt,o n
the line that connects x and y, such that xt  x and y  yt. Consider
the middle point between xt and yt and denote it by m. According
to the assumption, either m  x or y  m. In the former case deﬁne
xt+1 = m and yt+1 = yt, and in the latter case deﬁne xt+1 = xt and
yt+1 = m. The sequences {xt} and {yt} are converging, and they must
converge to the same point z since the distance between xt and yt
converges to zero. By the continuity of  we have z  x and y  z
and thus, by transitivity, y  x, contradicting the assumption that
x   y.
Comment on the Proof:
Anotherproofcouldbegivenforthemoregeneralcase, inwhichthe
assumption that the set X is convex is replaced by the assumption
that it is a connected subset of  n. Remember that a connected set
cannot be covered by two disjoint open sets. If there is no z such
that x   z   y, then X is the union of two disjoint sets {a|a   y}
and {a|x   a}, which are open by the continuity of the preference
relation.
Recall that a set Y ⊆ X is dense in X if in every open subset of X
there is an element in Y. For example, the set Y ={ x ∈  n| xk is a
rational number for k = 1,..,n} is a countable dense set in  n.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 36 Page number 20
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Proposition:
Assume that X is a convex subset of  n that has a countable dense
subset Y.I f  is a continuous preference relation, then  has a
(continuous) utility representation.
Proof:
By a previous claim we know that there exists a function v : Y →
[−1,1], which is a utility representation of the preference relation 
restricted to Y. For every x ∈ X, deﬁne U(x) = sup{v(z)|z ∈ Y and x  
z}. Deﬁne U(x) =− 1 if there is no z ∈ Y such that x   z, which
means that x is the minimal element in X. (Note that for z ∈ Y it
could be that U(z)<v(z).)
If x ∼ y, then x   z iff y   z. Thus, the sets on which the supre-
mum is taken are the same and U(x) = U(y).
If x   y, then by the lemma there exists z in X such that x   z   y.
By the continuity of the preferences  there is a ball around z such
that all the elements in that ball are inferior to x and superior to y.
Since Y is dense, there exists z1 ∈ Y such that x   z1   y. Similarly,
there exists z2 ∈ Y such that z1   z2   y. Finally,
U(x) ≥ v(z1) (by the deﬁnition of U and x   z1),
v(z1)>v(z2) (since v represents  on Y and z1   z2), and
v(z2) ≥ U(y) (by the deﬁnition of U and z2   y).
Bibliographic Notes
Recommended readings: Kreps 1990, 30–32; Mas-Colell et al. 1995,
chapter 3, C.
Fishburn (1970) covers the material in this lecture very well. The
example of lexicographic preferences originated in Debreu (1959)
(see also Debreu 1960, in particular Chapter 2, which is available
online at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p00b/p0097.pdf.)October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 37 Page number 21
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Problem 1. (Easy)
The purpose of this problem is to make sure that you fully understand the
basic concepts of utility representation and continuous preferences.
a. Is the statement “if both U and V represent  then there is a strictly
monotonic function f : → such that V(x) = f (U(x))” correct?
b. Can a continuous preference be represented by a discontinuous func-
tion?
c. Show that in the case of X =  , the preference relation that is rep-
resented by the discontinuous utility function u(x) =[ x] (the largest
integer n such that x ≥ n) is not a continuous relation.
d. Show that the two deﬁnitions of a continuous preference relation (C1
and C2) are equivalent to
Deﬁnition C3: For any x ∈ X, the upper and lower contours {y| y  x}
and {y| x  y} are closed sets in X,
and to
Deﬁnition C4: For any x ∈ X, the sets {y| y   x} and {y| x   y} are
open sets in X.
Problem 2. (Moderate)
Giveanexampleofpreferencesoveracountablesetinwhichthepreferences
cannot be represented by a utility function that returns only integers as
values.
Problem 3. (Moderate)
Consider the sequence of preference relations (n)n=1,2,.., deﬁned on  2
+
where n is represented by the utility function un(x1,x2) = xn
1 + xn
2. We will
say that the sequence n converges to the preferences ∗ if for every x and
y, such that x  ∗ y, there is an N such that for every n > N we have x  n y.
Show that the sequence of preference relations n converges to the prefer-
ences  ∗ which are represented by the function max{x1,x2}.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 38 Page number 22
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Problem 4. (Moderate)
The following is a typical example of a utility representation theorem:
Let X =  2
+. Assume that a preference relation  satisﬁes the following three
properties:
ADD: (a1,a2)  (b1,b2) implies that (a1 + t,a2 + s)  (b1 + t,b2 + s) for all t
and s.
MON:I fa1 ≥ b1 and a2 ≥ b2, then (a1,a2)  (b1,b2); in addition, if either
a1 > b1 or a2 > b2, then (a1,a2)   (b1,b2).
CON: Continuity.
a. Show that if  has a linear representation (that is,  are represented
by a utility function u(x1,x2) = αx1 + βx2 with α>0 and β>0), then
 satisﬁes ADD, MON and CON.
b. Suggest circumstances in which ADD makes sense.
c. Show that the three properties are necessary for  to have a linear
representation. Namely, show that for any pair of the three properties
there is a preference relation that does not satisfy the third property.
d. (This part is difﬁcult) Show that if  satisﬁes the three properties, then
it has a linear representation.
Problem 5. (Moderate)
Utilityisanumericalrepresentationofpreferences. Onecanthinkaboutthe
numerical representation of other abstract concepts. Here, you will try to
come up with a possible numerical representation of the concept “approx-
imately the same” (see Luce (1956) and Rubinstein (1988)). For simplicity,
let X be the interval [0,1].
Consider the following six properties of S:
(S-1) For any a ∈ X, aSa.
(S-2) For all a,b ∈ X,i faSb then bSa.
(S-3) Continuity (the graph of the relation S in X × X is a closed set).
(S-4) Betweenness: If d ≥ c ≥ b ≥ a and dSa then also cSb.
(S-5) For any a ∈ X there is an interval around a such that xSa for every x
in the interval.
(S-6) Denote M(a) = max{x|xSa} and m(a) = min{x|aSx}. Then, M and m
are (weakly) increasing functions and are strictly increasing whenever
they do not have the values 0 or 1.
a. Do these assumptions capture your intuition about the concept “ap-
proximately the same”?
b. Show that the relation Sε, deﬁned by aSεb if |b − a|≤ε (for positive ε),
satisﬁes all assumptions.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 39 Page number 23
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c. (Difﬁcult) Let S be a binary relation that satisﬁes the above six proper-
ties and let ε be a strictly positive number. Show that there is a strictly
increasing and continuous function H : X → such that aSb if and
only if |H(a) − H(b)|≤ε .
Problem 6. (Reading)
Read Kahneman (2000) (it is available at http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.
il/econt/k.pdf) and discuss his distinction between the different types of




Until now we have avoided any reference to behavior. We have
talked about preferences as a summary of the decision maker’s men-
tal attitude toward a set of alternatives. But economics is about
behavior, and therefore we now move on to modeling an agent’s
choice. The term “agent’s behavior” contains not only the speciﬁ-
cation of the agent’s actual choices made when he confronts certain
choice problems, it also contains a full description of his behavior
in all scenarios we imagine he might confront.
Consider a grand set X of possible alternatives. We view a choice
problem as a nonempty subset of X, and we refer to a choice from
A ⊆ X as specifying one of A’s members. We think about behavior
as a hypothetical response to a questionnaire that contains many
questions of the following type:
Q(A): Assume you have to choose from a set of alternatives A.
Which alternative would you choose?____
A legal response to this questionnaire requires responding to all
questions by indicating a unique element in A for every question
Q(A).
In some contexts, not all questions are meaningful. Therefore we
allow that the questionnaire consist of a subset of questions, one for
each element of a set D of subsets of X. We will refer to a pair (X,D)
as a context.
Example:
Imagine that we are interested in a student’s behavior regarding his
selection from the set of universities to which he has been admitted.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 41 Page number 25
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Let X ={ x1,...,xN} be the set of all universities in the scope of the
student’s imagination. A choice problem A is interpreted as the set
of universities to which he has been admitted. The fact that the
student was admitted to some subset of universities does not imply
his admission outcome for other universities. Therefore, D contains
the 2N − 1 nonempty subsets of X. But if, for example, the univer-
sities are listed according to difﬁculty in being admitted (x1 being
the most difﬁcult) and if the fact that the student is admitted to xk
means that he is admitted to all less prestigious universities, that is,
to all xl with l > k, then D will consist of the N sets A1,...,AN where
Ak ={ xk,...,xN}.
Given a context (X,D),achoice function C assigns to each set A ∈ D
auniqueelementofAwiththeinterpretationthatC(A)isthechosen
element from the set A.
Our understanding is that a decision maker behaving in accor-
dance with the function C will choose C(A) if he has to make a
choice from a set A. This does not mean that we can actually ob-
serve the choice function. At most we might observe some particu-
lar choices made by the decision maker in some instances. Thus, a
choice function is a description of hypothetical behavior.
Rational Choice Functions
It is typically assumed in economics that choice is an outcome of
“rational deliberation”. Namely, the decision maker has in mind a
preference relation  on the set X and, given any choice problem
A in D, he chooses an element in A which is  optimal. Assuming
that it is well deﬁned, we deﬁne the induced choice function C as
the function that assigns to every nonempty set A ∈ D the -best
element of A. Note that the preference relation is ﬁxed, that is, it is
independent of the choice set being considered.
Dutch Book Arguments
Some of the justiﬁcations for this assumption are normative, that is,
they reﬂect a perception that people should be rational in this sense
and, if they are not, they should convert to reasoning of this type.
One interesting class of arguments that aimed at supporting this ap-
proach is referred to in the literature as “Dutch book arguments.”October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 42 Page number 26
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The claim is that an economic agent who behaves according to a
choice function that is not induced from maximization of a prefer-
ence relation will not survive.
Thefollowingisa“sad”storyaboutamonkeyinaforestwiththree
trees,a,b, andc. Themonkeyisabouttopickatreetosleepin. Ithas
in mind a binary relation  that reﬂects the comparison he makes
mentally between any two trees such that a   b, b   c, and c   a.
Assume that whenever he is on tree a he sees only tree b, whenever
he is on tree b he sees only tree c, and whenever he is on tree c he
observes only tree a. The monkey’s choice function is C({a,b}) = b,
C({b,c}) = c, C({a,c}) = a. The monkey will perpetually jump from
tree to tree to tree—not a good mode of behavior in the “cruel”
environment of nature.
A similar “story,” more appropriate to human beings, is called the
“money pump” argument. Assume that a decision maker behaves
likethemonkeyregardingthreealternativesa, b, andc. Assumethat
(for all x and y) the choice C(x,y) = y is strong enough that while
he is “holding” the option to receive the alternative x, he is ready to
pay 1¢ for the ability to make the choice from {x,y}. In this case, he
can be “pumped” for his money by giving him a and offering him
to replace what he holds with b, c, and again a until his pockets are
emptied, or until the decision maker learns his lesson and changes
his behavior.
I bring this “Dutch book argument” here not as a necessarily con-
vincing argument for rationality but just as an interesting argument.
The above argument could be easily criticized. Its appeal requires, in
particular, that we be convinced that the environment in which the
economic agent operates would offer the agent the above sequence
of choice problems.
Rationalizing
Economists were often criticized for making the assumption that de-
cision makers maximize a preference relation. The most common
response to this criticism is that we don’t really need this assump-
tion. All we need to assume is that the decision maker’s behavior
can be described as if he were maximizing some preference relation.
Let us state this “economic defense” more precisely. We will say
that a choice function C can be rationalized if there is a preference
relation  on X so that C = C (that is, C(A) = C(A) for any A in
the domain of C).October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 43 Page number 27
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Figure 3.1
Violation of condition ∗.
We will now identify a condition under which a choice function
can indeed be presented as if derived from some preference relation
(i.e., can be rationalized).
Condition ∗:
We say that C satisﬁes condition ∗ if for any two problems A,B ∈ D,
if A ⊂ B and C(B) ∈ A then C(A) = C(B). (See ﬁg. 3.1.)
Note that if  is a preference relation on X, then C (deﬁned
on a set of subsets of X that have a single most preferred element)
satisﬁes ∗.
Alternatively, consider the “second-best procedure” in which the
decision maker has in mind an ordering  of X and for any given
choice problem set A chooses the element from A, which is the -
maximal from the nonoptimal alternatives. The second-best proce-
dure does not satisfy condition ∗:I fA contains all the elements in
B besides the -maximal, then C(B) ∈ A ⊂ B but C(A)  = C(B).
We will now show that condition ∗ is a sufﬁcient condition for a
choice function to be formulated as if the decision maker is maxi-
mizing some preference relation.
Proposition:
Assume that C is a choice function with a domain containing at
least all subsets of X of size no greater than 3. If C satisﬁes ∗, then
there is a preference  on X so that C = C.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 44 Page number 28
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Proof:
Deﬁne  by x  y if x = C({x,y}).
Let us ﬁrst verify that the relation  is a preference relation.
• Completeness: Follows from the fact that C({x,y}) is always well
deﬁned.
• Transitivity:I fx  y andy  z,thenC({x,y}) = xandC({y,z}) =
y.I f C({x,z})  = x then C({x,z}) = z.B y ∗ and C({x,z}) = z ,
C({x,y,z})  = x.B y∗ and C({x,y}) = x, C({x,y,z})  = y, and by ∗
and C({y,z}) = y, C({x,y,z})  = z. A contradiction to C({x,y,z})
∈{ x,y,z}.
We still have to show that C(B) = C(B). Assume that C(B) = x
and C(B)  = x. That is, there is y ∈ B so that y   x . By deﬁnition of
, this means C({x,y}) = y, contradicting ∗.
What Is an Alternative
Some of the cases where rationality is violated can be attributed to
the incorrect speciﬁcation of the space of alternatives. Consider the
following example taken from Luce and Raiffa (1957): A diner in a
restaurant chooses chicken from the menu {steak tartare, chicken} but
chooses steak tartare from the menu {steak tartare, chicken, frog legs}.
At ﬁrst glance it seems that he is not “rational” (since his choice
conﬂicts with ∗). Assume that the motivation for the choice is that
the existence of frog legs is an indication of the quality of the chef.
If the dish frog legs is on the menu, the cook must then be a real
expert, and the decision maker is happy ordering steak tartare, which
requires expertise to make. If the menu lacks frog legs, the decision
maker does not want to take the risk of choosing steak tartare.
Rationality is “restored” if we make the distinction between “steak
tartare servedinarestaurantwherefroglegsarealsoonthemenu(and
the cook must then be a real chef)” and “steak tartare in a restaurant
where frog legs are not served (and the cook is likely a novice).” Such
a distinction makes sense since the steak tartare is not the same in
the two choice sets.
The lesson from the above discussion is that we should be careful
in specifying the term “alternative.” Note, however, that deﬁning
any alternative in terms of its physical description and the choiceOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 45 Page number 29
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set from which it is to be chosen would empty the rationality hy-
pothesis of its meaning.
Choice Functions as “Internal Equilibria”
The choice function deﬁnition we have been using requires that
a single element be assigned to each choice problem. If the deci-
sion maker follows the rational-man procedure using a preference
relation with indifferences, the previously deﬁned induced choice
function C(A) might be undeﬁned because for some choice prob-
lems there would be more than one optimal element. This is one
of the reasons that in some cases we use the alternative following
concept to model behavior.
A choice function C is required to assign to every nonempty A ⊆ X
a nonempty subset of A, that is, C(A) ⊆ A. According to our in-
terpretation of a choice problem, a decision maker has to select a
unique element from every choice set. Thus, C(A) cannot be inter-
preted as the choice made by the decision maker when he has to
make a choice from A. The revised interpretation of C(A) is the set
of all elements in A that are satisfactory in the sense that the deci-
sion maker has no desire to move away from any of them. In other
words, a choice function reﬂects an “internal equilibrium”: If the
decision maker facing A considers an alternative outside C(A),h e
will not continue searching for another alternative. If he happens
to consider an alternative inside C(A), he will take it.
We now deﬁne the induced choice function (assuming it is never
empty) as C(A) ={ x ∈ A | x  y for all y ∈ A}. Condition ∗ is now
replaced by the condition that if x is revealed to be at least as good as
y in one choice problem, y will never be “chosen” without x when
x is feasible:
The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WA):
We say that C satisﬁes WA if whenever x,y ∈ A ∩ B, x ∈ C(A) and
y ∈ C(B), it is also true that x ∈ C(B) (ﬁg. 3.2). In other words, if y is
“chosen” while x is available, then it will never be the case that x is
“chosen” without y when both are available.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 46 Page number 30
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Figure 3.2
Violation of the weak axiom.
Proposition:
Assume that C is a choice function with a domain that includes at
least all subsets of size not greater than 3. Assume that C satisﬁes
WA. Then, there is a preference  so that C = C.
Proof:
Deﬁne x  y if x ∈ C({x,y}). We will now show that the relation is a
preference:
• Completeness: Follows from C({x,y})  =∅ .
• Transitivity:I f x  y and y  z then x ∈ C({x,y}) and y ∈
C({y,z}).I f x / ∈ C({x,z}), then C({x,z}) ={ z}.B y W A , x / ∈
C({x,y,z}) (by WA x cannot be revealed to be as good as z
because z was chosen without x from {x,z}). Similarly, y / ∈
C({x,y,z}) (by WA, y cannot be chosen without x while x ∈
C({x,y})). And also, z / ∈ C({x,y,z}) (by WA, z cannot be chosen
without y while y ∈ C({y,z})). This contradicts the nonempti-
ness of C({x,y,z}).
It remains to be shown that C(B) = C(B).
Assume that x ∈ C(B) and x / ∈ C(B). That is, there is y ∈ B so that
y is strictly better than x, or in other words, C({x,y}) ={ y}, thus
contradicting WA.
Assume that x ∈ C(B) and x / ∈ C(B). Let y ∈ C(B).B y W A x / ∈
C({x,y}) and thus C({x,y}) ={ y}, and therefore y   x, contradicting
x ∈ C(B).October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 47 Page number 31
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The Satisﬁcing Procedure
The fact that we can present any choice function satisfying con-
dition ∗ (or WA) as an outcome of the optimization of some pref-
erence relation is a key argument for the view that the scope of
microeconomic models is much wider than that of the models in
which agents carry out explicit optimization. But have we indeed
expanded the scope of economic models beyond the circumstances
in which decision makers carry out explicit optimization?
Consider the following “decision scheme,” named satisﬁcing by
Herbert Simon. Let v : X → be a valuation of the elements in X,
and let v∗ ∈ be a threshold of satisfaction. Let O be an ordering of
the alternatives in X. Given a set A, the decision maker arranges the
elements of this set in a list L(A,O) according to the ordering O.H e
then chooses the ﬁrst element in L(A,O) that has a v-value at least
as large as v∗. If there is no such element in A, the decision maker
chooses the last element in L(A,O).
Let us show that the choice function induced by this procedure
satisﬁes condition ∗. Assume that a is chosen from B and is also
a member of A ⊂ B. The list L(A,O) is obtained from L(B,O) by
eliminating all elements in B − A.I fv(a) ≥ v∗ then a is the ﬁrst sat-
isfactory element in L(B,O), and is also the ﬁrst satisfactory element
in L(A,O). Thus a is chosen from A. If all elements in B are un-
satisfactory, then a must be the last element in L(B,O). Since A is
a subset of B, all elements in A are unsatisfactory and a is the last
element in L(A,O). Thus, a is chosen from A.
Note, however, that even a “small” variation in this scheme leads
to a variation of the procedure such that it no longer satisﬁes ∗. For
example:
Satisﬁcing using two orderings: Let X be a population of university
graduates who are potential candidates for a job. Given a set of
actualcandidates, counttheirnumber. Ifthenumberissmallerthan
5, order them alphabetically. If the number of candidates is above
5, order them by their social security number. Whatever ordering
is used, choose the ﬁrst candidate whose undergraduate average is
above 85. If there are none, choose the last student on the list.
Condition ∗ is not satisﬁed. It may be that a is the ﬁrst candidate
with a satisfactory grade in a long list of students ordered by their
social security numbers. Still, a might not be the ﬁrst candidate
with a satisfactory grade on a list of only three of the candidates
appearing on the original list when they are ordered alphabetically.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 48 Page number 32
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The satisﬁcing procedure, though it is stated in a way that seems
unrelated to the maximization of a preference relation or utility
function, can be described as if the decision maker maximizes a pref-
erence relation. I know of no other examples of interesting general
schemes for choice procedures that satisfy ∗ other than the “rational
man” and the satisﬁcing procedures. However, later on, when we
discuss consumer theory, we will come across several other appeal-
ing examples of demand functions that can be rationalized though
they appear to be unrelated to the maximization of a preference
relation.
Psychological Motives Not Included within the Framework
The more modern attack on the standard approach to modeling eco-
nomic agents comes from psychologists, notably from Amos Tver-
sky and Daniel Kahneman. They have provided us with beautiful
examples demonstrating not only that rationality is often violated,
but that there are systematic reasons for the violation resulting from
certain elements within our decision procedures. Here are a few ex-
amples of this kind that I ﬁnd particularly relevant.
Framing
The following experiment (conducted by Tversky and Kahneman
1986) demonstrates that the way in which alternatives are framed
may affect decision makers’ choices. Subjects were asked to imagine
being confronted by the following choice problem:
An outbreak of disease is expected to cause 600 deaths in the US.
Twomutuallyexclusiveprogramsareexpectedtoyieldthefollowing
results:
a. 400 people will die.
b. With probability 1/3, 0 people will die and with probability
2/3, 600 people will die.
In the original experiment, a different group of subjects was given
the same background information and asked to choose from the
following alternatives:October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 49 Page number 33
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c. 200 people will be saved.
d. With probability 1/3, all 600 will be saved and with probability
2/3, none will be saved.
While only 22% of the ﬁrst group chose a, 72% of the second
group chose c. My experience offering both questions to 170 grad-
uate students in New York, Princeton, and Tel Aviv is similar even
thoughtheywerethesamestudentswhorespondedtothetwoques-
tions: 31% of the students chose a and 53% chose c.
These are “problematic” results since, by any reasonable criterion
a and c are identical alternatives, as are b and d. Thus, the choice
from {a,b} should be consistent with the choice from {c,d}. The
results expose the sensitivity of choice to the framing of the alterna-
tives. What is more basic to rational decision making than taking
the same choice when only the manner in which the problems are
stated is different?
Simplifying the Choice Problem and the Use of Similarities
The following experiment was also conducted by Tversky and Kah-
neman. One group of subjects was presented with the following
choice:
Choose one of the two roulette games a or b. Your prize is the
one corresponding to the outcome of the chosen roulette game as
speciﬁed in the following tables:
(a)
Color White Red Green Yellow
Chance % 90 6 1 3
Prize $ 0 45 30 −15
(b)
Color White Red Green Yellow
Chance % 90 7 1 2
Prize $ 0 45 −10 −15
A different group of subjects was presented the same background
information and asked to choose between:
(c)
Color White Red Green Blue Yellow
Chance % 90 6 1 1 2




Color White Red Green Blue Yellow
Chance % 90 6 1 1 2
Prize $ 0 45 45 −10 −15
In the original experiment, 58% of the subjects in the ﬁrst group
chose a, while nobody in the second group chose c. I presented
the two problems, one after the other, to 170graduate students in
New York, Princeton, and Tel Aviv: 43% chose a and 10% chose c.
Interestingly, the median response time among the students who
answered a was 60 seconds, whereas the median response time of
the students who answered b was 91 seconds.
The results demonstrate a common procedure people practice
when confronted with a complicated choice problem. We often
transfer the complicated problem into a simpler one by “canceling”
similar elements. While d clearly dominates c, the comparison be-
tweenaandb isnotaseasy. Manysubjects“cancel”theprobabilities
of Yellow and Red and are left with comparing the prizes of Green,
a process that leads them to choose a.
Incidentally, several times in the past, when I presented these
choice problems in class, I have had students (some of the best stu-
dents, in fact) who chose c. They explained that they identiﬁed the
second problem with the ﬁrst and used the procedural rule: “I chose
a from {a,b}. The alternatives c and d are identical to the alterna-
tives a and b, respectively. It is only natural then, that I choose c
from {c,d}.” This observation brings to our attention a hidden facet
of the rational-man model. The model does not allow a decision
maker to employ a rule such as: “In the past I chose x from B. The
choice problems A and B are similar. Therefore, I shall choose x
from A.”
Reason-Based Choice
Making choices sometimes involves ﬁnding reasons to pick one al-
ternative over the others. When the deliberation involves the use
of reasons strongly associated with the problem at hand (“internal
reasons”), we often ﬁnd it difﬁcult to reconcile the choice with the
rational man paradigm.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 51 Page number 35
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Imagine, for example, a European student who would choose
Princetonifallowedtochoosefrom{Princeton,LSE}andwouldchoose
LSE if he had to choose from {Princeton, Chicago, LSE}. His explana-
tion is that he prefers an American university so long as
he does not have to choose between American schools—a choice he
deems harder. Having to choose from {Princeton, Chicago, LSE},h e
ﬁnds it difﬁcult deciding between Princeton and Chicago and there-
fore chooses not to cross the Atlantic. His choice does not satisfy
∗, not because of a careless speciﬁcation of the alternatives (as in
the restaurant’s menu example discussed previously), but because
his reasoning involves an attempt to avoid the difﬁculty of making
a decision.
Another example follows Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982):
Leta = (a1,a2)be“aholidaypackageofa1 daysinParisanda2 days
in London.” Choose one of the four vectors a = (7,4), b = (4,7),
c = (6,3), and d = (3,6).
All subjects in the experiment agreed that a day in Paris and a day
in London are desirable goods. Some of the subjects were requested
to choose between the three alternatives a, b, and c; others had to
choose between a, b, and d. The subjects exhibited a clear tendency
toward choosing a out of the set {a,b,c} and choosing b out of the
set {a,b,d}.
A related experiment is reported by Tversky and Shaﬁr (1992):
Subjects reviewed a list of twelve lotteries, including:
(x) 65% chance to win $15.
(y) 30% chance to win $35.
(z) 65% chance to win $14.
Afterwards, they were presented with a pair of lotteries; some got
x and z and others y and z. They had to either choose one of them or
pay $1 and receive an additional option. Signiﬁcantly more subjects
chose to pay the extra dollar when they had to choose between x
and y than when they had to choose between x and z.
To conclude, decision makers look for reasons to prefer one alter-
nativeovertheother. Typically, makingdecisionsbyusing“external
reasons” (which do not refer to the properties of the choice set) will
not cause violations of rationality. However, applying “internal rea-
sons” such as “I prefer the alternative a over the alternative b since
a clearly dominates the other alternative c while b does not” might
cause conﬂicts with condition ∗.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 52 Page number 36
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Problem 1. (Easy)
Discuss the compatibility of the following “procedural elements” with the
“rational man” paradigm:
a. The decision maker has in mind a ranking of all alternatives and
chooses the alternative that is the worst according to this ranking.
b. The decision maker chooses an alternative with the intention that
another person will suffer the most.
c. The decision maker asks his two children to rank the alternatives and
then chooses the alternative that is the best “on average.”
d. The decision maker has an ideal point in mind and chooses the alter-
native that is closest to the ideal point.
e. The decision maker looks for the alternative that appears most often
in the choice set.
f. The decision maker always selects the ﬁrst alternative that comes to
his attention.
g. The decision maker searches for someone he knows who will choose
an action that is feasible for him.
h. The decision maker orders all alternatives from left to right and selects
the median.
Problem 2. (Moderately difﬁcult)
Let us say that you have to make a choice from a set A. Does it matter
whether (a) you make a choice from the entire set or (b) you ﬁrst partition
A into the subsets A1 and A2, then make a selection from each of the sets
and ﬁnally make a choice from the elements you selected from among A1
and A2?
a. Formulate a “path independence” property.
b. Show that the rational decision maker satisﬁes the property.
c. Find examples of choice procedures that do not satisfy this property.
d. Show that if a (single-valued) choice function satisﬁes path indepen-
dence, then it is consistent with rationality.
e. Assume that C is a (multivalued) choice function satisfying path inde-
pendence. Can it be rationalized by a preference relation?October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 54 Page number 38
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Problem 3. (Easy)
Check whether the following two choice functions satisfy WA:
C(A) ={ x ∈ A| the number of y ∈ X for which V(x) ≥ V(y) is at least |X|/2},
and if the set is empty then C(A) = A.
D(A) ={ x ∈ A|thenumberof y ∈ A for which V(x) ≥ V(y) is at least |A|/2 } .
Problem 4. (Moderately difﬁcult)
Consider the following choice procedure. A decision maker has a strict
ordering  over the set X and he assigns to each x ∈ X a natural number
class(x) interpreted as the “class” of x. Given a choice problem A he chooses
the element in A that is the best among those elements in A, that belong to
the “most popular” class in A (that is, the class that appears in A most often).
If there is more than one most popular class, he picks the best element from
the members of A that belong to a most popular class with the highest class
number.
a. Is the procedure consistent with the “rational man” paradigm?
b. Can every choice function be “explained” as an outcome of such a
procedure?
(Try to formalize a “property” that is satisﬁed by such choice procedures
and is clearly not satisﬁed by some other choice functions.)
Problem 5. (Moderately difﬁcult. Based on Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler
2002)
Consider the following two choice procedures. Explain the procedures and
try to persuade a skeptic that they “make sense.” Determine for each of
them whether they are consistent with the rational-man model.
a. The primitives of the procedure are two numerical (one-to-one) func-
tions u and v deﬁned on X and a number v∗. For any given choice
problem A, let a∗ ∈ A be the maximizer of u over A, and let b∗ be
the maximizer of v over the set A. The decision maker chooses a∗ if
v(a∗) ≥ v∗ and chooses b∗ if v(a∗)<v∗.
b. The primitives of the procedure are two numerical (one-to-one) func-
tions u and v deﬁned on X and a number u∗. For any given choice
problem A, the decision maker chooses the element a∗ ∈ A that maxi-
mizes u if u(a∗) ≥ u∗, and v if u(a∗)<u∗.
Problem 6. (Moderately difﬁcult)
The standard economic choice model assumes that choice is made from a
set. Let us construct a model where the choice is assumed to be from a list.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 55 Page number 39
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Let X be a ﬁnite “grand set.” A list is a nonempty ﬁnite vector of elements
in X. In this problem, consider a choice function C to be a function that
assigns to each vector L =< a1,...,aK > a single element from {a1,...,aK}.
(Thus, for example, the list < a,b > is distinct from < a,a,b > and < b,a >).
For all L1,...,Lm deﬁne < L1,...,Lm > to be the list that is the concatena-
tion of the m lists. (Note that if the length of Li is ki , the length of the
concatenation is  i=1,...,mki). We say that L  extends the list L if there is a list
M such that L  =< L,M >.
We say that a choice function C satisﬁes property I if for all L1,...,Lm
C(< L1,...,Lm >) = C(< C(L1),...,C(Lm)> ) .
a. Interpret property I. Give two (distinct) examples of choice functions
that satisfy I and two examples of choice functions which do not.
b. Deﬁne formally the following two properties of a choice function:
• Order Invariance: A change in the order of the elements of the list
does not alter the choice.
• Duplication Invariance: Deleting an element that appears in the list
elsewhere does not change the choice.
c. Characterize the choice functions that satisfy Order Invariance, Du-
plication Invariance, and condition I.
d. Assume now that in the back of the decision maker’s mind is a value
function u deﬁned on the set X (such that u(x)  = u(y) for all x  = y).
For any choice function C deﬁne vC(L) = u(C(L)).
We say that C accommodates a longer list if whenever L  extends L, vC(L ) ≥
vC(L) and there is a list L  which extends a list L for which vC(L )>vC(L).
e. Give two interesting examples of choice functions that accommodate
a longer list.
f. Give two interesting examples of choice functions which satisfy prop-
erty I but which do not accommodate a longer list.
Problem 7. (Reading)
Read Sen (1993). Invent two sound choice procedures and discuss their




Up to this point we have dealt with the basic economic model of
rational choice. In this lecture we will discuss a special case of the
rational man paradigm: the consumer. A consumer is an economic
agent who makes choices between available combinations of com-
modities. As usual, we have a certain image in mind: a person goes
to the marketplace with money in hand and comes back with a
bundle of commodities.
As before, we will begin with a discussion of consumer preferences
and utility, and only then discuss consumer choice. Our ﬁrst step is
to move from an abstract treatment of the set X to a more detailed
structure. We take X to be  K
+ ={ x = (x1,...,xK)| for all k, xk ≥ 0}.
An element of X is called a bundle. A bundle x is interpreted as a com-
bination of K commodities where xk is the quantity of commodity k.
Given this special interpretation of X, we impose some conditions
on the preferences in addition to those assumed for preferences in
general. The additional three conditions use the structure of the
space X: monotonicity uses the orderings on the axis (the ability
to compare bundles by the amount of any particular commodity);
continuity uses the topological structure (the ability to talk about
closeness); convexityusesthealgebraicstructure(theabilitytospeak
of the sum of two bundles and the multiplication of a bundle by a
scalar).
Monotonicity
Monotonicity is a property that gives commodities the meaning
of “goods.” It is the condition that more is better. Increasing the
amount of some commodities cannot hurt, and increasing the
amount of all commodities is strictly desired. Formally,October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 57 Page number 41
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Monotonicity:
The relation  satisﬁes monotonicity if for all x,y ∈ X,
if xk ≥ yk for all k, then x  y, and
if xk > yk for all k, then x   y.
In some cases, we will further assume that the consumer is strictly
happier with any additional quantity of any commodity.
Strong Monotonicity:
The relation  satisﬁes strong monotonicity if for all x,y ∈ X
if xk ≥ yk for all k and x  = y, then x   y.
Of course, in the case that preferences are represented by a util-
ity function, preferences satisfying monotonicity (or strong mono-
tonicity) are represented by monotonic increasing (or strong
monotonic increasing) utility functions.
Examples:
• The preference represented by min{x1,x2} satisﬁes monotonicity
but not strong monotonicity.
• The preference represented by x1 + x2 satisﬁes strong mono-
tonicity.
• The preference relation |x − x∗| satisﬁes nonsatiation, a related
property that is sometimes used in the literature: for every
x ∈ X and for any ε>0 there is some y ∈ X that is less than
ε away from x so that y   x. Every monotonic preference re-
lation satisﬁes nonsatiation, but the reverse is, of course, not
true.
Continuity
We will use the topological structure of  K
+ (induced from the stan-
dard distance function d(x,y) =

(xk − yk)2 ) to apply the deﬁni-
tionofcontinuitydiscussedinLecture2. WesaythatthepreferencesOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 58 Page number 42
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Figure 4.1
 satisfy continuity if for all a,b ∈ X,i fa   b, then there is an ε>0
such that x   y for any x and y such that d(x,a)<εand d(y,b)<ε .
Existence of a Utility Representation
Debreu’s theorem guarantees that any continuous preference rela-
tion is represented by some (continuous) utility function. If we
assume monotonicity as well, we then have a simple and elegant
proof:
Claim:
Any consumer preference relation satisfying monotonicity and con-
tinuity can be represented by a utility function.
Proof:
Let us ﬁrst show that for every bundle x, there is a bundle on
the main diagonal (having equal quantities of all commodi-
ties), such that the consumer is indifferent between that bun-
dle and the bundle x. (See ﬁg. 4.1.) The bundle x is at least as
good as the bundle 0 = (0,...,0). On the other hand, the bundleOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 59 Page number 43
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M = (maxk{xk},...,maxk{xk})isatleastasgoodasx. Both0andM are
on the main diagonal. By continuity, there is a bundle on the main
diagonal that is indifferent to x (see the problem set). By mono-
tonicity this bundle is unique; we will denote it by (t(x),...,t(x)).
Let u(x) = t(x). To see that the function u represents the preferences,
note that by transitivity of the preferences x  y iff (t(x),...,t(x)) 
(t(y),...,t(y)), and by monotonicity this is true iff t(x) ≥ t(y).
Convexity
Consider, for example, a scenario in which the alternatives are can-
didates for some position and are ranked in a left-right array as fol-
lows:
—–a—b—–c—–d——e—.
In normal circumstances, if we know that a voter prefers b to d,
then:
• We tend to conclude that c is preferred to d, but not necessarily
that a is preferred to d (the candidate a may be too extreme).
• We tend to conclude that d is preferred to e (namely, we do not
ﬁnd it plausible that both e and b are preferable to d).
Convexity is meant to capture related intuitions that rely on the
existence of “geography” in the sense that we can talk about an
alternative being between two other alternatives. The convexity
assumption is appropriate for a situation in which the argument “if
a move from d to b is an improvement then so is a move part of the
way to c” is legitimate, while the argument “if a move from b to d
is harmful then so is a move part of the way to c” is not.
Following are two formalizations of these two intuitions (ﬁg. 4.2).
We will see that they are equivalent.
Convexity 1:
The preference relation  satisﬁes convexity 1 if x  y and α ∈ (0,1)
implies that αx + (1 − α)y  y.
This captures the intuition that if x is preferred to y, then “going
a part of the way from y to x” is also an improvement.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 60 Page number 44
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Figure 4.2
Two deﬁnitions of convexity.
Convexity 2:
The relation  satisﬁes convexity 2 if for all y, the set AsGood(y) =
{z ∈ X|z  y} is convex.
(Recall that a set A is convex if for all a,b ∈ A and for all λ ∈[ 0,1],
λa + (1 − λ)b ∈ A.) This captures the intuition that if both z1 and z2
are better than y, then the average of z1 and z2 is deﬁnitely better
than y.
Claim:
A preference  satisﬁes convexity 1 if and only if it satisﬁes convex-
ity 2.
Proof:
Assume that  satisﬁes convexity 1 and let a  y and b  y ; without
loss of generality assume a  b. Then by the deﬁnition of convex-
ity 1, λa + (1 − λ)b  b and by the transitivity of , λa + (1 − λ)b  y
and thus λa + (1 − λ)b ∈ AsGood(y).
Assume that  satisﬁes convexity 2. If x  y then both x and y are
in AsGood(y) and thus αx + (1 − α)y ∈ AsGood(y), which means that
αx + (1 − α)y  y.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 61 Page number 45
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As usual, the above property also has a stronger version:
Strict Convexity:
The preference relation  satisﬁes strict convexity if for every a  y,
b  y, a  = b and λ ∈ (0,1) imply that λa + (1 − λ)b   y.
Example:




x2 satisfy strict convexity.
The preferences represented by min{x1,x2} and x1 + x2 satisfy con-
vexity but not strict convexity. The lexicographic preferences satisfy
strict convexity. The preferences represented by x2
1 + x2
2 do not sat-
isfy convexity.
We now look at the properties of the utility representations of
convex preferences.
Quasi-Concavity:
A function u is quasi-concave if for all y the set {x|u(x) ≥ u(y)} is
convex.
The term’s name derives from the fact that for any concave func-
tion f and for any y the set {x|f (x) ≥ f (y)} is convex.
Obviously, if a preference relation is represented by a utility func-
tion, then it is convex iff the utility function is quasi-concave. How-
ever, the convexity of  does not imply that a utility function
representing  is concave. (Recall that u is concave if for all x, y,
and λ ∈[ 0,1], we have u(λx + (1 − λ)y) ≥ λu(x) + (1 − λ)u(y).)
Special Classes of Preferences
Often in economics, we limit our discussion of consumer prefer-
ences to a class of preferences possessing some additional special
properties. Following are some examples of “popular” classes of





A preference  is homothetic if x  y implies αx  αy for all α ≥ 0.
(See ﬁg. 4.3.)
The preferences represented by  k=1,...,Kx
βk
k , where βk is positive,
are homothetic. In fact, any preference relation represented by a
utility function u that is homogeneous of any degree λ is homo-
thetic. (x  y iff u(x) ≥ u(y) iff αλu(x) ≥ αλu(y) iff u(αx) ≥ u(αy) iff
αx  αy).
Note that lexicographic preferences are also homothetic.
Claim:
Any homothetic, continuous, and monotonic preference relation
on the commodity bundle space can be represented by a utility func-
tion that is homogeneous of degree one.
Proof:
We have already proven that any bundle x has a unique bundle
(t(x),...,t(x)) on the main diagonal so that x ∼ (t(x),...,t(x)), and
that the function u(x) = t(x) represents . By the assumption thatOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 63 Page number 47
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Figure 4.4
Quasi-linear (in good 1) preferences.
the preferences are homothetic, αx ∼ (αt(x),...,αt(x)) and thus
u(αx) = αt(x) = αu(x).
Let us now consider an additional class of consumer preferences.
Quasi-Linear Preferences:
A preference is quasi-linear in commodity 1 (referred to as the “nu-
meraire”) if x  y implies (x + εe1)  (y + εe1) (where e1 = (1,0,...,
0) and ε>0). (See ﬁg. 4.4.)
Theindifferencecurvesofpreferencesthatarequasi-linearincom-
modity 1 are parallel to each other (relative to the ﬁrst commodity
axis). That is, if I is an indifference curve, then the set Iε ={ x|there
exists y ∈ I such that x = y + (ε,0,...,0)} is an indifference curve.
Any preference relation represented by x1 + v(x2,...,xK) for some
function v is quasi-linear in commodity 1. Furthermore:
Claim:
Any continuous preference relation satisfying strong monotonicity
(at least in commodity 1) and quasi-linearity in commodity 1 can
be represented by a utility function of the form x1 + v(x2,...,xK).October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 64 Page number 48
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Proof:
In the problem set you will prove that every preference relation that
is monotonic, continuous, and quasi-linear in commodity 1 sat-
isﬁes that for every (x2,...,xK) there is some number v(x2,...,xK)
so that (v(x2,...,xK),0,...,0) ∼ (0,x2,...,xK). Then, from quasi-
linearity in commodity 1, for every bundle x, (x1 + v(x2,...,xK),
0,...,0) ∼ (x1,x2,...,xK), and thus by strong monotonicity in the
ﬁrst commodity, the function x1 + v(x2,...,xK) represents  .
Differentiable Preferences (and the Use of Derivatives in Economic
Theory)
We often assume in microeconomics that utility functions are dif-
ferentiable and thus use standard calculus to analyze the consumer.
In this course I (almost) avoid calculus. This is part of a deliberate
attempt to steer you away from a “mechanistic” approach to eco-
nomic theory.
Can we give the differentiability of a utility function an “eco-
nomic” interpretation? We introduce a nonconventional deﬁnition
of differentiable preferences. Basically, differentiability of preferences
requires that the directions for improvement can be described using
“local prices.”
Let us conﬁne ourselves to preferences satisfying monotonicity
and convexity. For any vector x we say that the direction of change
d ∈  K is an improvement direction at x if there is some ε>0s o
that x + εd   x. In other words, there is some move from x in the
direction of d, which is an improvement. Let D(x) be the set of all
improvement directions at x. Given monotonicity, D(x) includes all
positive vectors. We say that a consumer’s monotonic preferences
 are differentiable at the bundle x if there is a vector v(x) of K non-
negative numbers so that D(x) contains all vectors d ∈  K for which
dv(x)>0( dv(x) is the inner product of d and v(x)). In such a case
the vector of numbers (v1(x),...,vK(x)) is interpreted as the vector
of “subjective values” of the commodities. Starting from x, any
small-enough move in a direction that is evaluated by this vector
as positive is an improvement. We say that  is differentiable if it is





• The preferences represented by 2x1 + 3x2 are differentiable. At
each point x, v(x) = (2,3).
• The preferences represented by min{x1,...,xK} are differen-
tiable only at points where there is a unique commodity k
for which xk < xl for all l  = k (verify). For example, at x =
(5,3,8,6),v(x) = (0,1,0,0).
Assume u is a differentiable quasi-concave utility function rep-
resenting the consumer’s preferences. Let du/dxk(x) be the partial
derivative of u with respect to the commodity k at point x. If all
vectors (du/dxk(x)) of partial derivatives are nonzero, then the in-
duced preference is differentiable with vk(x) = du/dxk(x) (the partial
derivative of u with respect to the commodity k at the point x).
Bibliographic Notes
Recommended readings: Kreps 1990, 32–37; Mas-Colell et al. 1995,
Chapter 3, A–C.
The material in this lecture up to the discussion of differentiability
is fairly standard and closely parallels that found in Arrow and Hahn
(1971).October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 66 Page number 50
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Problem 1. (Easy)
Characterize the preference relations on the interval [0,1] that are contin-
uous and strictly convex.
Problem 2. (Easy)
Show that if the preferences  satisfy continuity and x  y  z, then there
is a bundle m on the interval connecting x and z such that y ∼ m.
Problem 3. (Moderate)
Show that if the preferences  satisfy continuity and monotonicity, then
the function u(x), deﬁned by x ∼ (u(x),...,u(x)), is continuous.
Problem 4. (Moderate)
In a world with two commodities, consider the following condition:
The preference relation  satisﬁes convexity 3 if for all x and ε
(x1,x2) ∼ (x1 − ε,x2 + δ1) ∼ (x1 − 2ε,x2 + δ1 + δ2) implies δ2 ≥ δ1.
Interpret convexity 3 and show that for strong monotonic and continu-
ous preferences, it is equivalent to the convexity of the preference relation.
Problem 5. (Moderate)
Formulate and prove a proposition of the following type:
If the preferences  are quasi linear in all commodities, continuous, and
strongly monotonic, then there is a utility function of the form (...add a
condition here ...) that represents it.
Problem 6. (Difﬁcult)
Show that for any consumer’s preference relation  satisfying continuity,
monotonicity and quasi-linearity with respect to commodity 1 and for every
vector x, there is a number v(x) so that x ∼ (v(x),0,...,0).October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 67 Page number 51
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Problem 7. (Easy)
We say that a preference relation satisﬁes separability if it can be represented
byanadditiveutilityfunction, thatis, afunctionofthetypeu(x) =  kvk(xk).
Show that such preferences satisfy that for any subset of commodities J, and





















is the vector that takes the components of x for any k ∈ J and
takes the components of y for any k / ∈ J.
Demonstrate this condition geometrically for K = 2.
Problem 8. (Moderate)
Let  be monotonic and convex preferences that are represented by a dif-
ferentiable utility function u.
• Show that for every x there is a vector v(x) of K nonnegative numbers
sothatd isanimprovementatxiffdv(x)>0(dv(x)istheinnerproduct
of v(x)).
• Show that the preferences represented by the function min{x1,...,xK}
cannot be represented by a differentiable utility function.
• Check the differentiability of the lexicographic preferences in  2.
• Assume that for any x and for any d ∈ D(x), (x + d)   x. What can you
say about  ?October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 68 Page number 52
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Demand: Consumer Choice
The Rational Consumer’s Choice from a Budget Set
In Lecture 4 we discussed the consumer’s preferences. In this lec-
ture we adopt the “rational man” paradigm in discussing consumer
choice.
Given a consumer’s preference relation  on X =  K
+, we can talk
about his choice from any set of bundles. However, since we are
laying the foundation for “price models,” we are interested in the
consumer’s choice in a particular class of choice problems called
budget sets. A budget set is a set of bundles that can be represented
as B(p,w) ={ x ∈ X |px ≤ w}, where p is a vector of positive numbers
(interpreted as prices) and w is a positive number (interpreted as the
consumer’s wealth).
Obviously, any set B(p,w) is compact (it is closed since it is de-
ﬁned by weak inequalities, and bounded since for any x ∈ B(p,w)
and for all k,0≤ xk ≤ w/pk). It is also convex since if x,y ∈ B(p,w),
then px ≤ w , py ≤ w, xk ≥ 0, and yk ≥ 0 for all k. Thus, for all α ∈
[0,1], p[αx + (1 − α)y]=αpx + (1 − α)py ≤ w and αxk + (1 − α)yk ≥
0 for all k, that is, αx + (1 − α)y ∈ B(p,w).
Wewillrefertotheproblemofﬁndingthe-bestbundleinB(p,w)
as the consumer’s problem.
Claim:
If  is a continuous relation, then all consumer problems have a
solution.
Proof:
If  is continuous, then it can be represented by a continuous utility
function u. By the deﬁnition of the term “utility representation,”October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 69 Page number 53
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ﬁnding an  optimal bundle is equivalent to solving the problem
maxx∈B(p,w)u(x). Since the budget set is compact and u is continuous,
the problem has a solution.
To emphasize that a utility representation is not necessary for the
current analysis, let us study a direct proof of the previous claim,
avoiding the notion of utility.
Direct Proof:
For any x ∈ B(p,w) deﬁne the set Inferior(x) ={ y ∈ B(p,w)|x   y}.B y
the continuity of the preferences, every such set is open. Assume
there is no solution to the consumer’s problem of maximizing  on
B(p,w). Then, every z ∈ B(p,w) is a member of some set Inferior(x),
that is, the collection of sets {Inferior(x)| x ∈ X} covers B(p,w). A col-
lection of open sets that covers a compact set has a ﬁnite subset of
sets that covers it. Thus, there is a ﬁnite collection Inferior(x1),...,
Inferior(xn) that covers B(p,w). Letting xj be the optimal bundle
within the ﬁnite set {x1,...,xn}, we obtain that xj is an optimal bun-
dle in B(p,w), a contradiction.
Claim:
If  is convex, then the set of solutions for a choice from B(p,w) (or
any other convex set) is convex.
Proof:
Ifbothxandy maximizegivenB(p,w),thenαx + (1 − α)y ∈ B(p,w)
and, by the convexity of the preferences, αx + (1 − α)y  x  z for
all z ∈ B(p,w). Thus, αx + (1 − α)y is also a solution to the con-
sumer’s problem.
Claim:
If  is strictly convex, then every consumer’s problem has at most
one solution.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 70 Page number 54
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Proof:
Assume that both x and y (where x  = y) are solutions to the con-
sumer’s problem B(p,w). Then x ∼ y (both are solutions to the same
maximization problem) and αx + (1 − α)y ∈ B(p,w) (the budget set
is convex). By the strict convexity of , αx + (1 − α)y   x, which is
a contradiction of x being a maximal bundle in B(p,w).
The Consumer’s Problem with Differentiable Preferences
Whenthepreferencesaredifferentiable, weareprovidedwitha“use-
ful” condition for characterizing the optimal solution.
Claim:
If x∗ is an optimal bundle in the consumer problem and k is a con-
sumed commodity (i.e., x∗
k > 0), then it must be that vk(x∗)/pk ≥
vj(x∗)/pj for all other j, where vk(x∗) are the “subjective value num-
bers” (see the deﬁnition of differentiable preferences in Lecture 4).
Proof:
Assume that x∗ is a solution to the consumer’s problem B(p,w) and
that x∗
k > 0 and vk(x∗)/pk < vj(x∗)/pj (see ﬁg. 5.1). A “move” in the
direction of reducing the consumption of the k-th commodity by
1 and increasing the consumption of the j-th commodity by pk/pj
is an improvement since vj(x∗)pk/pj − vk(x∗)>0. As x∗
k > 0, we can
ﬁnd ε>0 small enough such that decreasing k’s quantity by ε and
increasing j’s quantity by εpk/pj is feasible. This brings the consumer
to a strictly better bundle, contradicting the assumption that x∗ is a
solution to the consumer’s problem.
For the case in which the preferences are represented by a util-
ity function u, we have vk(x∗) = ∂u/∂xk(x∗). In other words, the
“value per dollar” at the point x∗ of the k-th commodity (which
is consumed) must be as large as the “value per dollar” of any other
commodity.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 71 Page number 55
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Figure 5.1
(a) x∗ is a solution to the con-
sumer problem B(p,w).
(b) x∗ is not a solution to the
consumer problem B(p,w).
From the above we can derive the “classic” necessary conditions
on the consumer’s maximization:
Claim:
If x∗ is a solution to the consumer’s problem B(p,w) and both x∗
k > 0
and x∗
j > 0, then the ratio vk(x∗)/vj(x∗) must be equal to the price
ratio pk/pj.
In order to establish sufﬁcient conditions for maximization, we
require also that the preferences be convex.
Claim:
If  is monotonic, convex, continuous, and differentiable, and if
at x∗
• px∗ = w,
• for all k such that x∗
k > 0, and for any commodity l, vk(x∗)/pk ≥
vl(x∗)/pl,
then x∗ is a solution to the consumer’s problem.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 72 Page number 56
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Proof:
If x∗ is not a solution, then there is a bundle z such that pz ≤ px∗
and z   x∗. By continuity and monotonicity, there is a bundle y  =
z, with yk ≤ zk such that y   x∗ and py < pz ≤ px∗. By convexity,
any small move in the direction (y − x∗) is an improvement and by
differentiability, v(x∗)(y − x∗)>0.
Let µ = vk(x∗)/pk for all k with x∗
k > 0. Now,







(since for a good with x∗
k > 0 we have pk = vk(x∗)/µ, and for a good k
with x∗
k = 0, (yk − x∗
k) ≥ 0 and pk ≥ vk(x∗)/µ.) Thus, 0 ≥ v(x∗)(y − x∗),
a contradiction.
The Demand Function
We have arrived at an important stage on the way to developing
a market model in which we derive demand from preferences. As-
sume that the consumer’s preferences are such that for any B(p,w),
the consumer’s problem has a unique solution. Let us denote this
solution by x(p,w). The function x(p,w) is called the demand func-
tion. The domain of the demand function is  
K+1




Consider a consumer in a world with two commodities having the
followinglexicographicpreferencerelation, attachingtheﬁrstprior-
ity to the sum of the quantities of the goods and the second priority
to the quantity of commodity 1:
x  y if x1 + x2 > y1 + y2 or both x1 + x2 = y1 + y2 and x1 ≥ y1.
This preference relation is strictly convex but not continuous. It
induces the following noncontinuous demand function:
x((p1,p2),w) =

(0,w/p2) if p2 < p1
(w/p1,0) if p2 ≥ p1
.
Wenowturntostudyingsomepropertiesofthedemandfunction.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 73 Page number 57
Demand: Consumer Choice 57
Claim:
x(p,w) = x(λp,λw) (i.e., the demand function is homogeneous of de-
gree zero).
Proof:
This follows (with no assumptions about the preference relations)
from the basic equality B(λp,λw) = B(p,w) and the assumption that
the behavior of the consumer is “a choice from a set.”
Note that this claim is sometimes interpreted as implying that
“uniform inﬂation does not matter.” This is an incorrect interpre-
tation. We assumed, rather than concluded, that choice is made
from a set independently of the way that the choice set is framed.
Inﬂation can affect choice since behavior may be sensitive to the
nominal prices and wealth even if the budget set is unchanged.
Claim (Walras’s law):
If the preferences are monotonic, then any solution x to the con-
sumer’s problem B(p,w) is located on its budget curve (and thus,
px(p,w) = w).
Proof:
Ifnot,thenpx < w. Thereisanε>0suchthatp(x1 + ε,...,xK + ε) <
w. By monotonicity, (x1 + ε,...,xK + ε)   x, thus contradicting the
assumption that x is optimal in B(p,w).
Claim:
If  is a continuous preference, then the demand function is con-
tinuous in prices (and also in w, see problem set).October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 74 Page number 58
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Proof:
Once again, we could use the fact that the preferences have a contin-
uous utility representation and apply a standard “maximum theo-
rem.” (If the function f (x,a) is continuous, then the function h(a) =
argmaxxf (x,a) is continuous.) However, I prefer to present a proof
that does not use the notion of a utility function:
Assume not. Then, there is a sequence of price vectors pn con-
verging to p∗ such that x(p∗,w) = x∗, and x(pn,w) does not converge
to x∗. Thus, we can assume that (pn) is a sequence converging to p∗
such that for all n the distance d(x(pn,w),x∗)>εfor some positive ε.
All numbers pn
k are greater than some positive number m. There-
fore, all vectors x(pn,w) belong to some compact set (the hypercube
of bundles with no quantity above w/m) and thus, without loss of
generality, we can assume that x(pn,w) → y∗ for some y∗  = x∗.
Since pnx(pn,w) ≤ w for all n, it must be that p∗y∗ ≤ w, that is, y∗ ∈
B(p∗,w). Since x∗ is the unique solution for B(p∗,w), we have x∗   y∗.
By the continuity of the preferences, there are neighborhoods of x∗
and y∗ in which the strict preference is preserved. For sufﬁciently
large n, x(pn,w) is in that neighborhood of y∗. Choose a bundle z∗
in the neighborhood of x∗ so that p∗z∗ < w. For all sufﬁciently large
n, pnz∗ < w; however, z∗   x(pn,w), which is a contradiction.
Rationalizable Demand Functions
As in the general discussion of choice, we will now examine whether
choice procedures are consistent with the rational man model. We
can think of various possible deﬁnitions of rationalization.
One approach is to look for a preference relation (without im-
posing any restrictions that ﬁt the context of the consumer) such
that the chosen element from any budget set is the unique bundle
maximizing the preference relation in that budget set. Thus, we say
that the preferences  fully rationalize the demand function x if for
any (p,w) the bundle x(p,w) is the unique  maximal bundle within
B(p,w).
Alternatively, we could say that “being rationalizable” means that
therearepreferencessuchthattheconsumer’sbehaviorisconsistent
with maximizing those preferences, that is, for any (p,w) the bun-
dle x(p,w) is a  maximal bundle (not necessarily unique) withinOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 75 Page number 59
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B(p,w). This deﬁnition is “empty” since any demand function is
consistentwithmaximizingthe“totalindifference”preference. This
is why we usually say that the preferences  rationalize the demand
function x if they are monotonic and for any (p,w), the bundle x(p,w)
is a  maximal bundle within B(p,w).
Of course, if behavior satisﬁes homogeneity of degree zero and
Walras’s law, it is still not necessarily rationalizable in any of those
senses:
Example 1:
Consider the demand function of a consumer who spends all his
wealth on the “more expensive” good:
x((p1,p2),w) =

(0,w/p2) if p2 ≥ p1
(w/p1,0) if p2 < p1
.
This demand function is not entirely inconceivable, and yet it
is not rationalizable. To see this, assume that it is fully rationaliz-
able or rationalizable by . Consider the two budget sets B((1,2),1)
and B((2,1),1). Since x((1,2),1) = (0,1/2) and (1/2,0) is an internal
bundle in B((1,2),1), by any of the two deﬁnitions of rationalizabil-
ity, it must be that (0,1/2)   (1/2,0). Similarly, x((2,1),1) = (1/2,0)
and (0,1/2) is an internal bundle in B((2,1),1). Thus, (0,1/2) ≺
(1/2,0), a contradiction.
Example 2:
Aconsumerchoosesabundle(z,z,...,z), wherez satisﬁesz pk = w.
This behavior is fully rationalized by any preferences according
to which the consumer strictly prefers any bundle on the main di-
agonal over any bundle that is not (because, for example, he cares
primarily about purchasing equal quantities from all sellers of the K
goods), while on the main diagonal his preferences are according to
“the more the better”. These preferences rationalize his behavior in
the ﬁrst sense but are not monotonic.
This demand function is also fully rationalized by the mono-
tonic preferences represented by the utility function u(x1,...,xK) =
min{x1,...,xK}.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 76 Page number 60
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Example 3:
Consider a consumer who spends αk of his wealth on commodity k
(where αk ≥ 0 and  K
k=1αk = 1). This rule of behavior is not formu-
lated as a maximization of some preference relation. It can how-
ever be fully rationalized by the preference relation represented by
the Cobb-Douglas utility function u(x) =  K
k=1x
αk
k . A solution x∗ to
the consumer’s problem B(p,w) must satisfy x∗
k > 0 for all k (notice
that u(x) = 0 when xk = 0 for some k). Given the differentiability
of the preferences, a necessary condition for the optimality of x∗ is
that vk(x∗)/pk = vl(x∗)/pl for all k and l where vk(x∗) = du/dxk(x∗) =
αku(x∗)/x∗
k for all k. It follows that pkx∗
k/plx∗
l = αk/αl for all k and l
and thus x∗
k = αkw/pk for all k.
Example 4:
Let K = 2. Consider the behavior of a consumer who allocates his
wealth between commodities 1 and 2 in the proportion p2/p1 (the
cheaper the good, the higher the share of the wealth devoted to
it). Thus, x1p1/x2p2 = p2/p1 and xi(p,w) = (pj/(pi + pj))w/pi. This
demand function satisﬁes Walras’s law as well as homogeneity of
degree zero.
To see that this demand function is fully rationalizable, note that
xi/xj = p2
j /p2









x2 satisﬁes the condition that the ratio of




x1. Thus, for any (p,w), the






The Weak and Strong Axioms of Revealed Preferences
We now look for general conditions that will guarantee that a de-
mand function x(p,w) can be fully rationalized (a similar discussion
would apply to the other deﬁnition of rationalizability that requires
that x(p,w) maximizes a monotonic preference relation). Of course,
one does not necessarily need these general conditions to determine
whether a demand function is rationalizable. Guessing is often an
excellent strategy.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 77 Page number 61
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Figure 5.2
(a) Satisﬁes the weak axiom. (b) Does not satisy the weak axiom.
In the general discussion of choice functions, we saw that the
weak axiom (WA) was a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a
choice function to be derived from some preference relation. In the
proof, we constructed a preference relation out of the choices of the
decision maker from sets containing two elements. We showed (by
looking into his behavior at the choice set {a,b,c}) that WA implies
that it is impossible for a to be revealed as better than b, b revealed
as better than c, and c revealed as better than a. However, in the
context of a consumer, ﬁnite sets are not within the scope of the
choice function.
In the same spirit, adjusting to the context of the consumer, we
might try to deﬁne x   y if there is (p,w) so that both x and y are in
B(p,w) and x = x(p,w). In the context of the consumer model the
Weak Axiom is read: if px(p ,w ) ≤ w and x(p,w)  = x(p ,w ), then
p x(p,w)>w . WA guarantees that it is impossible that both x   y
and y   x. However, the deﬁned binary relation is not necessarily
complete: there can be two bundles x and y such that for any B(p,w)
containing both bundles, x(p,w) is neither x nor y. Furthermore, in
the general discussion, we guaranteed transitivity by looking at the
union of a set in which a was revealed to be better than b and a set in
which b was revealed to be as good as c. However, when the sets are
budget sets, their union is not necessarily a budget set. (See ﬁg. 5.2.)October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 78 Page number 62
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Apparently WA is not a sufﬁcient condition for extending the bi-
nary relation  , as deﬁned above, into a complete and transitive
relation (an example with three goods from Hicks 1956 is discussed
in Mas-Colell et al. 1995). A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for
a demand function x satisfying Walras’s law and homogeneity of
degree zero to be rationalized is the following:
Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SA):
If (xn)n=1,...,N is a sequence of bundles and (B(pn,wn))n=1,...,N is a se-
quence of budget sets so that for all n ≤ N − 1, xn  = xn+1 and xn is
chosen from B(pn,wn) which also contains xn+1, then x1 / ∈ B(pN,wN).
The Strong Axiom is basically equivalent to the assumption that
the relation   derived from revealed behavior is transitive. But  
is not necessarily a complete relation, and thus we are left with the
question of whether   can be extended into preferences. Proving
that this is possible is beyond the scope of this course. In any case,
the SA is “cumbersome,” and using it to determine whether a certain
demand function is rationalizable may not be a trivial task.
Decreasing Demand
Theconsumermodeldiscussedsofarconstitutesthestandardframe-
work for deriving demand. Our intuition tells us that demand for
a good falls when its price increases. However, this does not follow
from the standard assumptions about the rational consumer’s be-
havior which we have discussed so far. The following is an example
of a preference relation that induces demand that is nondecreasing
in the price of one of the commodities:
An Example in Which Demand for a Good May Increase with Price




x1 + x2 if x1 + x2 < 1
x1 + 4x2 if x1 + x2 ≥ 1
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Figure 5.3
These preferences might reﬂect reasoning of the following type:
“In the bundle x there are x1 + x2 units of vitamin A and x1 + 4x2
units of vitamin B. My ﬁrst priority is to get enough vitamin A.
However, once I satisfy my need for 1 unit of vitamin A, I move on
to my second priority, which is to consume as much as possible of
vitamin B.” (See ﬁg 5.3.)
Consider x((p1,2),1). Changing p1 is like rotating the budget lines
around the pivot bundle (0,1/2). At a high price p1 (as long as p1 >
2), the consumer demands (0,1/2). If the price is reduced to within
the range 2 > p1 > 1, the consumer chooses the bundle (1/p1,0).
So far, the demand for the ﬁrst commodity indeed increased when
its price fell. However, in the range 1 > p1 > 1/2 we encounter an
anomaly: the consumer buys as much as possible from the second
good subject to the “constraint” that the sum of the goods is at least
1, i.e., x((p1,2),1) = (1/(2 − p1),(1 − p1)/(2 − p1)).
The above preference relation is monotonic but not continuous.
However, we can construct a close continuous preference that leads
to demand that is increasing in p1 in a similar domain. Let αδ(t) be
a continuous and increasing function on [1 − δ,1+ δ] where δ>0,
so that αδ(t) = 0 for all t ≤ 1 − δ and αδ(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 1 + δ. The
utility function
uδ(x) = (αδ(x1 + x2)(x1 + 4x2)) + (1 − αδ(x1 + x2)(x1 + x2))
is continuous and monotonic. For δ close to 0, the function uδ = u
except in a narrow area around the set of bundles for which
x1 + x2 = 1.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 80 Page number 64
64 Lecture Five
Now, take two prices, H > 1 and L < 1, such that a consumer
with utility function u consumes more of the ﬁrst commodity when
facing the budget set ((H,2),1) than when facing the budget set
((L,2),1) (that is, 1/H > 1/(2 − L)). When δ is close enough to 0,
the demand induced from uδ at B((H,2),1) is (1/H,0). Choose  
such that 1/(2 − L) +  <1/H. For δ close enough to 0, the bundle
in the budget set of B((L,2),1) with x1 = 1/(2 − L) +   is preferred
(according to uδ) over any other bundle in B((L,2),1) with a higher
quantity of x1. Thus, for small enough δ, the induced demand for
the ﬁrst commodity at the lower price is at most 1/(2 − L) +  , and
is thus lower than the demand at the higher price.
“The Law of Demand”
We are interested in comparing demand in different environments.
We have just seen that the classic assumptions about the consumer
do not allow us to draw a clear conclusion regarding the relation
between a consumer’s demand when facing B(p,w) and his demand
when facing B(p + (0,...,ε,...,0),w).
Aclearconclusioncanbedrawnwhenwecomparetheconsumer’s
demand when he faces the budget set B(p,w) to his demand when
facing B(p ,x(p,w)p ). In this comparison we imagine the price vec-
tor changing from p to an arbitrary p  and wealth changing in such
a way that the consumer has exactly the resources allowing him to
consume the same bundle he consumed at (p,w). (See ﬁg. 5.4.)
Claim:
Let x be a demand function satisfying Walras’s law and WA. If
w  = p x(p,w), then either x(p ,w ) = x(p,w) or [p  − p][x(p ,w ) −
x(p,w)] < 0.
Proof:
Assume that x(p ,w )  = x(p,w). Then,
[p  − p][x(p ,w ) − x(p,w)]
= p x(p ,w ) − p x(p,w) − px(p ,w ) + px(p,w)
= w  − w  − px(p ,w ) + w = w − px(p ,w )October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 81 Page number 65
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Figure 5.4
Acompensatedpricechangefrom(p,w)to(p ,w ).
(by Walras’s law and the assumption that w  = p x(p,w)), and by WA
the right-hand side of the equation is less than 0.
Bibliographic Notes
Recommended readings: Kreps 1990, 37–45, Mas-Colell et al. 1995,
Chapter 2, A–D, 3, D,J.
The material in this lecture, up to the discussion of differentiabil-
ity, is fairly standard and closely parallels that found in Arrow and
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Problem 1. (Easy)
Calculate the demand function for a consumer with the utility function 
k αk ln(xk).
Problem 2. (Easy)
Verify that when preferences are continuous, the demand function x(p,w)
is continuous in prices and in wealth (and not only in p).
Problem 3. (Easy)
Show that if a consumer has a homothetic preference relation, then his
demand function is homogeneous of degree one in w.
Problem 4. (Easy)
Consider a consumer in a world with K = 2, who has a preference relation
that is quasi-linear in the ﬁrst commodity. How does the demand for the
ﬁrst commodity change with w?
Problem 5. (Moderately Difﬁcult)
Let  be a continuous preference relation (not necessarily strictly convex)
and w a number. Consider the set G ={ (p,x) ∈  K ×  K| x is optimal in
B(p,w)}. (For some price vectors there could be more than one (p,x) ∈ G.)
Calculate G for the case of K = 2 and preferences represented by x1 + x2.
Show that (in general) G is a closed set.
Problem 6. (Moderately difﬁcult)
Determine whether the following behavior patterns are consistent with the
consumer model (assume K = 2):
a. The consumer’s demand function is x(p,w) = (2w/(2p1 + p2),
w/(2p1 + p2)).
b. He consumes up to the quantity 1 of commodity 1 and spends his
excess wealth on commodity 2.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 83 Page number 67
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c. The consumer chooses the bundle (x1,x2) which satisﬁes x1/x2 = p1/p2




Problem 7. (Moderately difﬁcult)
In this question, we consider a consumer who behaves differently from the
classic consumer we talked about in the lecture. Once again we consider a
world with K commodities. The consumer’s choice will be from budget sets.
The consumer has in mind a preference relation that satisﬁes continuity,
monotonicity, and strict convexity; for simplicity, assume it is represented
by a utility function u.
The consumer maximizes utility up to utility level u0. If the budget set
allowshimtoobtainthislevelofutility, hechoosesthebundleinthebudget
set with the highest quantity of commodity 1 subject to the constraint that
his utility is at least u0.
a. Formulate the consumer’s problem.
b. Show that the consumer’s procedure yields a unique bundle.
c. Is this demand procedure rationalizable?
d. Does the demand function satisfy Walras’s law?
e. Show that in the domain of (p,w) for which there is a feasible bun-
dle yielding utility of at least u0 the consumer’s demand function for
commodity 1 is decreasing in p1 and increasing in w.
f. Is the demand function continuous?
Problem 8. (Moderately difﬁcult)
A common practice in economics is to view aggregate demand as being
derived from the behavior of a “representative consumer.” Give two ex-
amples of “well-behaved” consumer preference relations that can induce
average behavior that is not consistent with maximization by a “represen-
tative consumer.” (That is, construct two “consumers,” 1 and 2, who choose
the bundles x1 and x2 out of the budget set A and the bundles y1 and y2 out
of the budget set B so that the choice of the bundle (x1 + x2)/2 from A and of
the bundle (y1 + y2)/2 from B is inconsistent with the model of the rational
consumer.)October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 84 Page number 68
LECTURE 6
Choice over Budget Sets and the Dual Problem
Indirect Preferences
As an introduction to the ﬁrst topic in this lecture, let us go back to
the general choice function concept discussed in Lecture 3. Having
in mind a preference relation  on a set X, the decision maker may
want to construct a preference relation over the set D, the domain
of his choice function. When assessing a choice problem in D, the
decision maker may then ask himself which alternative he would
choose if he had to choose from that set. The “rational” decision
maker will prefer a set A over a set B if the alternative he intends
to choose from A is preferable to that which he intends to choose
from B. This leads us to the deﬁnition of ∗, the indirect preferences
induced from :
A ∗ B if C(A)  C(B).
The deﬁnition of indirect preferences ignores some considerations
that might be taken into account when comparing choice sets. Ex-
cluded are considerations such as, “I prefer A −{ b} to A even though
I intend to choose a in any case since I am afraid to make a mistake
and choose b” or “I will choose a from A whether b is available or
not. However, since I don’t want to have to reject b, I prefer A −{ b}
to A.”
Ofcourse, ifu representsandthechoicefunctioniswelldeﬁned,
v(A) = u(C(A)) represents ∗. We will refer to v as the indirect utility
function.
Finally, note that sometimes (depending on the set D) one can
reconstruct the choice function C(A) from the indirect preferences
∗. For example, if a ∈ A and A  ∗ A −{ a}, then C(A) = a.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 85 Page number 69
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The Consumer’s Indirect Utility Function
Let us return to the consumer who chooses bundles from budget
sets. He might be interested in formulating indirect preferences
when choosing a market to live in or when assessing the effect of
tax reforms (which cause changes in prices or wealth) on his welfare.
Since a budget set is characterized by the K + 1 parameters (p,w), the
above approach leads to the deﬁnition of the indirect preferences ∗
on the set  
K+1
++ as (p,w) ∗ (p ,w ) if x(p,w)  x(p ,w ). Interpreting
p in the standard manner, as prices prevailing in the market, deﬁn-
ing indirect preferences in this way precludes considerations such
as, “I prefer to live in an area where alcohol is very expensive even
though I drink a lot”.
The following are basic properties of the indirect preferences ∗ ,
induced from the preferences  on the bundle space. The ﬁrst is
an “invariance to presentation” property, which follows from the
deﬁnition of indirect preferences independently of the properties of
the consumer’s preferences. The other three properties depend on
the following characteristics of the consumer’s preferences: mono-
tonicity(usingthepartialorderingsonthebundlespace), continuity
(using the topological structure), and convexity (using the algebraic
structure).
1. (λp,λw) ∼∗ (p,w) (this follows from x(λp,λw) = x(p,w)).
2. ∗ is nonincreasing in pk and increasing in w (reducing the
scope of the choice is never beneﬁcial, and additional wealth
makes it possible to consume bundles containing more of all
commodities).
3. If the preference relation  is continuous, then so is ∗, and
thereisacontinuousfunctionv representing∗ .(Thefunction
x(p,w) is continuous. Let u be a continuous function represent-
ing ; then u(x(p,w)) is a continuous utility representation of
∗ and thus ∗ is continuous.)
4. If (p1,w1) ∗ (p2,w2), then (p1,w1) ∗ (λp1 + (1 − λ)p2,λw1 +
(1 − λ)w2) for all 1 ≥ λ ≥ 0. (See ﬁg. 6.1.) (Thus, if v repre-
sents ∗, then it is quasi-convex, that is, the set {(p,w)| v(p,w) ≤
v(p∗,w∗)} is convex). To see this, let z be the best bundle in
the budget set B(λp1 + (1 − λ)p2,λw1 + (1 − λ)w2). Then (λp1 +
(1 − λ)p2)z ≤ λw1 + (1 − λ)w2 and therefore p1z ≤ w1 or p2z ≤
w2. Thus z ∈ B(p1,w1) or z ∈ B(p2,w2) and then x(p1,w1)  zOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 86 Page number 70
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Figure 6.1
The indirect utility function is quasi-convex.
or x(p2,w2)  z. From x(p1,w1)  x(p2,w2) it follows that
x(p1,w1)  z.
Example:
In the single commodity case, each ∗-indifference curve is a ray.
Assuming monotonicity of , the slope of an indifference curve
through (p1,w) is x1(p1,w) = w/p1.
Roy’s Equality
We will now look at a method of deriving the consumer demand
function from indirect preferences. The basic idea is that starting
from a budget set (p∗,w∗), any change of ε in the price of commod-
ity k combined with a change of εxk(p∗,w∗) in wealth cannot be
undesirable. Thus, when indirect preferences are differentiable, the
tangent to the indifference curve of the indirect preferences through
(p∗,w∗) gives the demand for that budget set.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 87 Page number 71
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Claim:
Assume that the demand function satisﬁes Walras’s law. Let H =
{(p,w)| (x(p∗,w∗),−1)(p,w) = 0} for some (p∗,w∗). The hyperplane
H is tangent to the ∗ indifference curve through (p∗,w∗).
Proof:
Of course (p∗,w∗) ∈ H. For any (p,w) ∈ H, the bundle x(p∗,w∗) ∈
B(p,w). Hence x(p,w)  x(p∗,w∗), and thus (p,w) ∗ (p∗,w∗).
In the case in which ∗ is represented by differentiable v,
H ={ (p,w)| (∂v/∂p1(p∗,w∗),...,∂v/∂pK(p∗,w∗),
∂v/∂w(p∗,w∗))(p − p∗,w − w∗) = 0}.
From the above claim and since w∗ = p∗x(p∗,w∗) we have also
H ={ (p,w)| (x(p∗,w∗),−1)(p − p∗,w − w∗) = 0}.
Therefore, the vector
(∂v/∂p1(p∗,w∗),...,∂v/∂pK(p∗,w∗),∂v/∂w(p∗,w∗))




In normal discourse, we consider the following two statements to
be equivalent:
1. The maximal distance a turtle can travel in 1 day is 1 km.
2. The minimal time it takes a turtle to travel 1 km is 1 day.
This equivalence actually relies on two “hidden” assumptions:
a. For (1) to imply (2) we need to assume the turtle travels a posi-
tive distance in any period of time. Contrast this with the case
in which the turtle’s speed is 2 km/day but, after half a day,October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 88 Page number 72
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it must rest for half a day. Then, the maximal distance it can
travel in 1 day is 1 km but it can travel this distance in only
half a day.
b. For(2)toimply(1)weneedtoassumetheturtlecannot“jump”
a positive distance in zero time. Contrast this with the case in
which the turtle’s speed is 1 km/day but after a day of traveling
it can “jump” 1 km. Thus, it needs 1 day to travel 1 km but
within 1 day it can travel 2 km.
The assumptions that in any positive interval of time the turtle
can travel a positive distance and that the turtle cannot “jump” are
sufﬁcient for the equivalence of (1) and (2). Let M(t) be the maximal
distance the turtle can travel in time t. Assume that the function
M is strictly increasing and continuous. Then, the statement, “The
maximal distance a turtle can travel in t∗ is x∗” is equivalent to the
statement, “The minimal time it takes a turtle to travel x∗ is t∗.”
If the maximal distance that the turtle can pass within t∗ is x∗,
and if it covers the distance x∗ in t < t∗ then, by the strict mono-
tonicity of M, the turtle would cover a distance larger than x∗ in t∗,
a contradiction.
If it takes t∗ for to the turtle to cover the distance x∗ and if it passes
the distance x > x∗ in t∗, then by the continuity of M at some t < t∗
the turtle will already be beyond the distance x∗, a contradiction.
The Dual Consumer Problem
Let u be a utility function that is continuous and monotonic. Ap-
plying the duality idea to the consumer problem, we compare the
following pair of maximization problems:
The prime problem P(p,w∗)
Find a bundle maximizing utility given an expense level w∗, that is,
maxx{u(x)| px ≤ w∗}.
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The dual problem D(p,u∗)
Find a bundle minimizing the expenses needed to obtain a level of
utility u∗, that is,
minx{px| u(x) ≥ u∗}.
Claim:
1. If x∗ is the solution to the problem P(p,w∗), then it is also the
solution to the dual problem D(p,u(x∗)).
2. If x∗ is a solution to the dual problem D(p,u∗), then it is also
the solution to the problem P(p,px∗).
Proof:
1. If x∗ is not a solution to the dual problem D(p,u(x∗)), then there
exists a strictly cheaper bundle x for which u(x) ≥ u(x∗). For
some positive vector ε (that is, εk > 0 for all k), it still holds that
p(x + ε) < px∗ ≤ w. By monotonicity u(x + ε) > u(x) ≥ u(x∗),
contradicting the assumption that x∗ is a solution to P(p,w∗).
2. If x∗ is not a solution to the problem P(p,w∗), then there exists
an x such that px ≤ px∗ and u(x)>u(x∗) ≥ u∗. By continuity,
for some nonnegative vector ε  = 0, x − ε is a bundle such that
u(x − ε) > u∗ and p(x − ε) < px∗, contradicting the assumption
that x∗ is a solution to D(p,u∗).
The Hicksian Demand Function
Assume that the dual problem D(p,u) has a unique solution. This
is the case, for example, if u represents strictly convex continuous
preferences. The Hicksian demand function h(p,u) is the solution
to D(p,u). This concept is analogous to the demand function in the
prime problem.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 90 Page number 74
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Here are some properties of the Hicksian demand function:
1. h(λp,u) = h(p,u).I f x is a solution to the problem D(p,u),
it is also a solution to the problem D(λp,u). The function
λpx is a positive linear transformation of px; thus, the prob-
lem minx{λpx| u(x) ≥ u} has the same solution as the problem
minx{px| u(x) ≥ u}.
2. hk(p,u) is nonincreasing in pk. Note that for every p  ph(p,u) ≤
ph(p ,u) since h(p ,u) also satisﬁes the constraint of achieving
a utility level of at least u and h(p,u) is the cheapest bundle
satisfying the constraint. Similarly, p h(p ,u) ≤ p h(p,u). Thus,
(p − p )(h(p,u) − h(p ,u)) = p[h(p,u) − h(p ,u)]
+ p [h(p ,u) − h(p,u)]≤0.
When p − p  = (0,..., ,...,0) we get that hk(p,u) − hk(p ,u) ≤
0. Thus, increasing the price of commodity k has a nonpositive
effect on Hicksian demand.
3. h(p,u) is continuous in p (verify!).
Deﬁnee(p,u) = ph(p,u)tobetheexpenditurefunction. Thisconcept
is analogous to the indirect utility function in the prime problem.
Here are some properties of the expenditure function:
1. e(λp,u) = λe(p,u) (it follows from h(λp,u) = h(p,u)).
2. e(p,u) is non-decreasing in pk and strictly increasing in u.
3. e(p,u) is continuous in p (this follows from the continuity of
h(p,u)).
4. e(p,u) is concave in p (not only in pk). To prove this, let
x = h(λp1 + (1 − λ)p2,u∗). Since u(x) = u∗, e(pi,u∗) ≤ pix; thus
e(λp1 + (1 − λ)p2,u∗) = (λp1 + (1 − λ)p2)x ≥ λe(p1,u∗)
+ (1−λ)e(p2,u∗).
Claim (the Dual Roy’s Equality):
The hyperplane H ={ (p,e)| e = ph(p∗,u∗)} is tangent to the graph of
the function e = e(p,u∗) at point p∗.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 91 Page number 75
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Proof:
Since ph(p∗,u∗) ≥ ph(p,u∗) for all price vectors p, the hyperplane
H lies on one side of the graph of the function e = ph(p,u∗) and
intersects the graph at the point (p∗,e(p∗,u∗)).
Bibliographic Notes
Recommended readings: Kreps 1990, 45–63; MWG, chapter 2, E–F;
3, D–G, I–J.
Roy and Hicks are the sources for most of the material in this
lecture. Speciﬁcally, the concept of the indirect utility function is
due to Roy (1942); the concept of the expenditure function is due to
Hicks (1946); and the concepts of consumer surplus used in Problem
6 are due to Hicks (1939). See also McKenzie (1957). For a full
representation of the duality idea, see, for example, Varian (1984)
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Problem 1. (Easy)
In a world with two commodities, consider a consumer’s preferences that
are represented by the utility function u(x1,x2) = min{x1,x2}.
a. Calculate the consumer’s demand function.
b. Verify that the preferences satisfy convexity.
c. Calculate the indirect utility function v(p,w).
d. Verify Roy’s Equality.
e. Calculate the expenditure function e(p,u) and verify Dual Roy’s
Equality.
Problem 2. (Moderate)
Imagine that you are reading a paper in which the author uses the indirect
utility function v(p1,p2,w) = w/p1 + w/p2. You suspect that the author’s
conclusions in the paper are the outcome of the “fact” that the function v
is inconsistent with the model of the rational consumer. Take the following
steps to make sure that this is not the case:
a. Use Roy’s Equality to derive the demand function.
b. Show that if demand is derived from a smooth utility function, then





c. Construct a utility function with the property that the ratio of the





d. Calculate the indirect utility function derived from this utility func-
tion. Do you arrive at the original v(p1,p2,w)? If not, can the original
indirect utility function still be derived from another utility function
satisfying the property in (c).
Problem 3. (Moderate)
Aconsumerwithwealthw isinterestedinpurchasingonlyoneunitofoneof
the items included in a (ﬁnite) set A. All items are indivisible. The consumer
does not derive any “utility” from leftover wealth. The consumer evaluates
commodity x ∈ A by the number Vx (where the value of not purchasing any
of the goods is 0). The price of commodity x ∈ A is px > 0.
a. Formulate the consumer’s problem.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 93 Page number 77
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b. Check the properties of the indirect utility function (homogeneity of
degree zero, monotonicity, continuity and quasi-convexity).
c. Calculate the indirect utility function for the case in which A ={ a,b}
and Va > Vb > 0.
Problem 4. (Moderate)
Show that if the utility function is continuous, then so is the Hicksian de-
mand function h(p,u).
Problem 5. (Moderate)
A commodity k is Giffen if the demand for the k-th good, xk(p,w), is in-
creasing in pk. A commodity k is inferior if the demand for the commodity
decreases with wealth. Show that if a commodity k is Giffen in some neigh-
borhood of (p,w), then k is inferior.
Problem 6. (Moderate)
One way to compare budget sets is by using the relation ∗ as deﬁned in
the text. According to this approach, the comparison between (p,w) and
(p ,w) is made by comparing two numbers u(x(p,w)) and u(x(p ,w)), where
u is a utility function deﬁned on the space of the bundles.




 ,w) = w − e(p
 ,u) = e(p,u) − e(p
 ,u)
where u = u(x(p,w)).
This is the answer to the question: What is the change in wealth that
would be equivalent, from the perspective of (p,w), to the change in price
vectors from p to p ?
Deﬁne:
EV(p,p
 ,w) = e(p,u
 ) − w = e(p,u
 ) − e(p
 ,u
 )
where u = u(x(p
 ,w)).
This is the answer to the question: What is the change in wealth that
would be equivalent, from the perspective of (p ,w), to the change in price
vectors from p to p ?
Now, answer the following questions regarding a consumer in a two-
commodity world with a utility function u:
a. For the case u(x1,x2) = x1 + x2, calculate the two “consumer surplus”




c. Explain why the two measures are identical if the individual has quasi-
linear preferences in the second commodity and in a domain where
the two commodities are consumed in positive quantities.
d. Assume that the price of the second commodity is ﬁxed and that the
price vectors differ only in the price of the ﬁrst commodity. What
is the relation of the two measures to the “area below the demand
function” (which is a standard third deﬁnition of consumer surplus)?October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 95 Page number 79
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Production
The Producer: The Basic Model
We will turn now to a very brief discussion of the basic concepts
in classic producer theory. As this involves only a few new abstract
ideas, we make do with a short introduction to the concepts and
implicit assumptions.
Usually we view the ﬁrm as a special type of rational decision
maker. Recall that when discussing the consumer we imposed a
strong structure on the choice sets but few constraints on the pref-
erences. In contrast, classic producer theory assigns the producer
a highly structured target function but fewer constraints on the
choice sets.
Let 1,...,K be commodities. The producer’s choice will be made
from subsets of the “grand set,” which will be taken to be a K-
dimensional Euclidean space. A vector z in this space is interpreted
as a production combination; positive components in z are inter-
preted as outputs and negative components as inputs.
Producer’s Preferences
Itisassumedthatthegoaloftheproducer(ﬁrm)istomaximizeproﬁts.
The competitive producer faces a vector of prices p = (pk)k=1,...,K (for
inputs and outputs). If he chooses z, his proﬁts (revenues minus
costs) will be pz =
k
k=1 pk · zk. In other words, it is assumed that his
preferences over any set of possible production combinations are
represented by the utility function pz.
Technology
A producer’s choice set is called a technology and speciﬁes the pro-
duction constraints.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 96 Page number 80
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Figure 7.1
The following restrictions are usually placed on the technology
space (ﬁg. 7.1):
1. 0 ∈ Z (this is interpreted to mean that the producer can remain
“idle”).
2. There is no z ∈ Z ∩ K
+ besides the vector 0 (no production with
no resources).
3. Free disposal:i fz ∈ Z and z  ≤ z, then z  ∈ Z (nothing prevents
the producer from being inefﬁcient in the sense that it uses
more resources than necessary to produce the same amount of
commodities).
4. Z is a closed set.
5. Z isaconvexset. (Thisassumptionembodiesdecreasingmargi-
nal productivity. Together with the assumption that 0 ∈ Z,i t
implies nonincreasing returns to scale:i f z ∈ Z, then for every
λ<1, λz ∈ Z.)
The Production Function
Consider the case in which commodity K is produced from com-
modities 1,...,K − 1, that is, for all z ∈ Z, zK ≥ 0 and for all k  = K,
zk ≤ 0. In this case, another intuitive way of specifying the techno-October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 97 Page number 81
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logical constraints on the producer is by a production function which
speciﬁes, for any positive vector of inputs v ∈ R
K−1
+ , the maximum
amount of commodity K that can be produced.
If we start from technology Z, we can derive the production func-
tion by deﬁning
f (v) = max{x| (−v,x) ∈ Z}.
Alternatively, if we start from the production function f , we can
derive the “technology” by deﬁning Z(f ) ={ (−w,x)| x ≤ y and w ≥
v for some y = f (v)}. If the function f satisﬁes the assumptions of
f (0) = 0, continuity, and concavity, then Z(f ) satisﬁes the above
assumptions.
The Supply Function
We will now discuss the producer’s behavior. The producer’s prob-
lem is deﬁned as maxz∈Zpz.
The existence of a unique solution for the producer problem re-
quires some additional assumptions such as that Z be bounded from
above (that is, there is some bound B such that B ≥ zk for any z ∈ Z)
and that Z be strictly convex (that is, if z and z  are in Z, then the com-
bination λz + (1 − λ)z  is an internal point in Z for any 1 >λ>0).
When the producer’s problem has a unique solution, we denote
it by z(p). We refer to the function z(p) as the supply function. Note
thatitspeciﬁesboththeproducer’ssupplyofoutputsanditsdemand
for inputs. The proﬁt function π(p) = maxz∈Zpz is analogous to the
indirect utility function in the consumer model.
Recall that when discussing the consumer, we speciﬁed the pref-
erences and we described his behavior as making a choice from a
budget set that had been determined by prices. The consumer’s be-
havior (demand) speciﬁed the dependence of his consumption on
prices. In the case of the producer, we specify the technology and
we describe his behavior as maximizing a proﬁt function which is
determined by prices. The producer’s behavior (supply) speciﬁes the
dependence of output and the consumption of inputs on prices.
In the case of the producer, preferences are linear and the con-
straintisaconvexset, whereasintheconsumermodeltheconstraint
is a linear inequality and preferences are convex. The structure




and on the consumer’s preferences. Thus, the producer’s problem is
similar to that of the consumer’s dual problem. (See ﬁg. 7.2.)
Properties of the Supply and Proﬁt Functions
Let us turn to some of the properties of the supply and proﬁt func-
tions. Thepropertiesandtheirproofsareanalogoustotheproperties
and proofs in the discussion of the consumer’s dual problem.
Supply Function
1. z(λp) = z(p). (The producer’s preferences are induced by the
price vector p and are identical to those induced by the price
vector λp.)
2. z is continuous.
3. Assume the supply function is well deﬁned. If z(p)  = z(p ),w e
have (p − p )[z(p) − z(p )]=p[z(p) − z(p )]+p [z(p ) − z(p)] > 0.
In particular, if (only) the kth price increases, zk increases; that
is, if k is an output (zk > 0), the supply of k increases; and if k
is an input (zk < 0), the demand for k decreases. Note that this
result, called the law of supply, applies to the standard supplyOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 99 Page number 83
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function (unlike the law of demand, which was applied to the
compensated demand function).
Proﬁt Function
1. π(λp) = λπ(p). (Follows from z(λp) = z(p).)
2. π is continuous. (Follows from the continuity of the supply
function.)
3. π is convex. (For all p,p  and λ,i fz maximizes proﬁts with λp +
(1 − λ)p  then π(λp + (1 − λ)p ) = λpz + (1 − λ)p z ≤ λπ(p) +
(1 − λ)π(p ).)
4. Hotelling’s lemma: For any vector p∗, π(p) ≥ pz(p∗) for all p.
Therefore, the hyperplane {(p,π) | π = pz(p∗)} is tangent to
{(p,π) | π = π(p)}, the graph of function π at the point (p∗,
π(p∗)).I fπ is differentiable, then dπ/dpk(p∗) = zk(p∗).
5. From Hotelling’s lemma it follows that if π is differentiable,
then dzj/dpk(p∗) = dzk/dpj(p∗).
The Cost Function
If we are only interested in the ﬁrm’s behavior in the output mar-
ket (but not in the input markets), it is sufﬁcient to specify the
costs associated with the production of any combination of out-
puts as opposed to the details of the production function. Thus, for
a producer of the commodities L + 1,...,K, we deﬁne c(p,y) to be
the minimal cost associated with the production of the combina-
tion y ∈ 
K−L
+ given the price vector p ∈  L
++ of the input commodi-
ties 1,...,L. If the model’s primitive is a technology Z, we have
c(p,y) = mina{pa| (−a,y) ∈ Z}. (See ﬁg. 7.3.)
Discussion
In the conventional economic approach we allow the consumer
“general” preferences but restrict producer goals to proﬁt maximiza-
tion. Thus, a consumer who consumes commodities in order to
destroy his health is within the scope of our discussion, while a pro-
ducer who cares about the welfare of his workers or has in mind a




are various empirically plausible alternative targets for a producer.
For example, it seems that the goal of some producers is to increase
production subject to not incurring a loss. Some ﬁrms are managed
so as to increase the managers’ salaries with less regard for the level
of proﬁts.
I sometimes wonder why this difference exists between the gen-
erality of consumer preferences and the narrowness of the producer
objectives. It might be that this is simply the result of mathematical
convenience. I don’t think this is a result of an ideological con-
spiracy. But, by making proﬁt maximization the key assumption
about producer behavior, do we not run the risk that students will
interpret it to be the exclusive normative criterion guiding a ﬁrm’s
actions?
Bibliographic Notes
Recommended readings: Kreps 1990, Chapter 8; Mas-Colell et al.
1995, Chapter 5, A–D,G.
The material in this lecture (apart from the discussion) is standard
and can be found in any microeconomics textbook. Debreu (1959)
is an excellent source.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 101 Page number 85
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Problem 1. (Easy)
Assume that technology Z and the production function f describe the same
producer who produces commodity K using inputs 1,...,K − 1. Show that
Z is a convex set if and only if f is a concave function.
Problem 2. (Boring)
Here is a very standard exercise (if you have not done it in the past, it may
be “fun” to do it “once in a lifetime”): Calculate the supply function z(p)
and the proﬁt function π(p) for each of the following production functions:
• f (a) = aα
1 for α ≤ 1.
• g(a) = αa1 + βa2 for α>0 and β>0.
• h(a) = min{a1,a2}.
• i(a) = (aα
1 + aα
2)1/α for α ≤ 1.
Problem 3. (Easy)
Consider a producer who uses L inputs to produce K − L outputs. Show the
following:
• C(λw,y) = λC(w,y).
• C is nondecreasing in any input price wk.
• C is concave in w.
• Shepherd’s lemma: If C is differentiable, dC/dwk(w,y) = ak(w,y) (the
kth input commodity).
•I f C is twice continuously differentiable, then for any two commodi-
ties j and kd a k/dwj(w,y) = daj/dwk(w,y).
Problem 4. (Moderately difﬁcult. Based on Radner (1993).)
It is usually assumed that the cost function C is convex in the output vec-
tor. Much of the research on production has been aimed at investigating
whether the convexity assumptions can be induced in more detailed mod-
els. Convexity often fails when the product is related to the gathering of
information or data processing.
Consider, forexample, aﬁrmconductingatelephonesurveyimmediately
following a TV program. Its goal is to collect information about as manyOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 102 Page number 86
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viewers as possible within 4 units of time. The wage paid to each worker
is w (even when he is idle). In one unit of time, a worker can talk to one
respondent or be involved in the transfer of information to or from exactly
one colleague. At the end of the 4 units of time, the collected information
must be in the hands of one colleague (who will announce the results).
• What is the ﬁrm’s product?
• Calculate the cost function and examine its convexity.
Problem 5. (Moderately difﬁcult)
ConsideraﬁrmproducingonecommodityusingLinputs, whichmaximizes
production subject to the constraint of nonnegative proﬁts. Show some
interesting properties of such a ﬁrm’s behavior.
Problem 6. (Standard)
An event that could have happened with probability 0.5 either did or did
not occur. A ﬁrm has to provide a report of the form “the event occurred” or
“the event did not occur.” The quality of the report, q (the ﬁrm’s product), is
the probability that the report is correct. The ﬁrm employs k experts (input)
to prepare the report. Each of them receives an independent signal whether
the event occurred or not, which is correct with probability 1 > p > 0.5.
• Calculate the production function q = f (k) for (at least) k = 1,2,3,....
• Wesaythata“discrete”productionfunctionisconcaveifthesequence
of marginal product is nonincreasing. Is the ﬁrm’s production func-
tion concave?
Assume that the ﬁrm needs information in order to make a decision
whether to invest amount m that will yield revenue αm if the event
occurs, and 0 otherwise; the decision maker chooses k in order to
maximize expected proﬁts. Assume that the wage of each worker is w.
• Explain why it is true that if f is concave, the ﬁrm chooses k∗ so that
the k∗th worker is the last one for whom marginal revenue exceeds
the cost of a single worker.




When thinking about decision making, we often distinguish be-
tween actions and consequences. An action is chosen and leads to
a consequence. The rational man has preferences over these conse-
quences and is meant to choose a feasible action that leads to the
most desired consequence. In our discussion of the rational man,
we have so far not distinguished between actions and consequences
since it was unnecessary for modeling situations where each action
deterministically leads to a particular consequence.
In this lecture we will discuss a decision maker in an environment
in which the correspondence between actions and consequences is
not deterministic but stochastic. The choice of an action is viewed
as choosing a “lottery ticket” where the prizes are the consequences.
We will be interested in preferences and choices over the set of
lotteries.
Let Z be a set of consequences (prizes). In this lecture we assume
that Z is a ﬁnite set. A lottery is a probability measure on Z, i.e.,
a lottery p is a function that assigns a nonnegative number p(z) to
each prize z, where  z∈Zp(z) = 1. The number p(z) is taken to be the
objective probability of obtaining the prize z given the lottery p.
Denote by [z] the degenerate lottery for which [z](z) = 1. We will
use the notation αx ⊕ (1 − α)y to denote the lottery in which the
prize x is realized with probability α and the prize y with probability
1 − α.
Denote by L(Z) the (inﬁnite) space containing all lotteries with
prizes in Z. Given the set of consequences Z, the space of lotter-
ies L(Z) can be identiﬁed with a simplex in Euclidean space: {x ∈
 Z
+|  xz = 1}. Recall that  Z
+ is the set of functions from Z into  +.
The extreme points of the simplex correspond to the degenerate
lotteries.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 104 Page number 88
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We will talk about preferences over L(Z). An implicit assumption
is that the decision maker does not care about the nature of the
random factors but only about the distribution of consequences. To
appreciate this point, consider a case in which the probability of
rain is 1/2 and Z ={ z1,z2}, where z1 = “having an umbrella” and
z2 = “not having an umbrella.” A “lottery” in which you have z1
if it is raining and z2 if it is not is not equivalent to the “lottery”
in which you have z1 if it is not raining and z2 if it is. Thus, we
have to be careful not to apply the model in contexts where the
attitude toward the consequence depends on the event realized in
each possible contingence.
Preferences
Let us start by thinking about examples of “sound” preferences over
a space L(Z). Following are some examples:
• Preference for uniformity: The decision maker prefers the lottery
that is less disperse where dispersion is measured by  k(pk −
1/K)2.
• Extreme preference for certainty: The decision maker prefers p to
q if maxzp(z) is greater than maxzq(z).
• The size of the support: The decision maker evaluates each lot-
tery by the number of prizes that can be realized with positive
probability, that is, by the size of the support of the lottery,
supp(p) ={ z|p(z)>0}. He prefers the one with the smaller sup-
port (p  q if |supp(p)|≤| supp(q)|).
In the examples above, the preferences ignored the consequences
and were dependant on the probability vectors alone. In the fol-
lowing examples, the preferences take into account the evaluation
of the prizes as well.
• Increasing the probability of a “good” outcome: The set Z is par-
titioned into two disjoint sets G and B (good and bad), and
the decision maker prefers the lottery that yields “good” prizes
with higher probability.
• The worst case: The decision maker evaluates lotteries by the
worst possible case. He attaches a number v(z) to each prize z
and p  q if min{v(z)| p(z)>0}≥min{v(z)| q(z)>0}. This cri-
terion is often used in Computer Science, where one algorithmOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 105 Page number 89
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is preferred to another if it functions better in the worst case
independently of the likelihood of the worst case occurring.
• Comparing the most likely prize: The decision maker considers
the prize in each lottery which is most likely (breaking ties in
some arbitrary way) and compares two lotteries according to a
basic preference relation over Z.
• Lexicographic preferences: The prizes are ordered z1, ...,zK and
the lottery p is preferred to q if (p(z1),...,p(zK)) ≥L (q(z1),...,
q(zK)).
• Expected utility: A number v(z) is attached to each prize and a
lottery is evaluated according to its expected v, that is, accord-
ing to  zp(z)v(z). Thus,
p  q if U(p) =  z∈Zp(z)v(z) ≥ U(q) =  z∈Zq(z)v(z).
The richness of examples calls for the classiﬁcation of preference
relations over lotteries and the study of properties that these rela-
tions satisfy. The methodology we follow is to formally state general
principles (axioms) that may apply to preferences over the space of
lotteries. Each axiom carries with it a consistency requirement or in-
volves a procedural aspect of decision making. The axiomatization
of a family of preference relations provides justiﬁcation for focusing
on that speciﬁc family.
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Axiomatization
The version of the von Neumann-Morgenstern axiomatization pre-
sented here uses two axioms, the independence and continuity ax-
ioms.
The Independence Axiom
In order to state the ﬁrst axiom we require an additional concept,
called Compound lotteries (ﬁg. 8.1): Given a K-tuple of lotteries
(pk) and a K-tuple of nonnegative numbers (αk)k=1,...,K that sum up
to 1, deﬁne ⊕K
k=1αkpk to be the lottery for which (⊕K
k=1αkpk)(z) =
 K
k=1αkpk(z). Verify that ⊕K
k=1αkpk is indeed a lottery. When only
two lotteries p1 and p2 are involved, we use the notation α1p1 ⊕ (1 −
α1)p2.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 106 Page number 90
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Figure 8.1
The compound lottery ⊕K
k=1αkpk.
We think of ⊕K
k=1αkpk as a compound lottery with the following
two stages:
Stage 1: Itisrandomlydeterminedwhichofthelotteriesp1,...,pK
is realized; αk is the probability that pk is realized.
Stage 2: The prize ﬁnally received is randomly drawn from the
lottery determined in stage 1.
When we compare two compound lotteries, αp⊕(1 − α)r and
αq⊕(1 − α)r, we tend to simplify the comparison and form our pref-
erence on the basis of the comparison between p and q. This intu-
ition is translated into the following axiom:
Independence (I):
For any p,q,r ∈ L(Z) and any α ∈ (0,1),
p  q iff αp ⊕ (1 − α)r  αq ⊕ (1 − α)r.









⊕ (1 − αk∗)(⊕k =k∗[αk/(1 − αk∗)]pk) 
αk∗qk∗
⊕ (1 − αk∗)(⊕k =k∗[αk/(1 − αk∗)]qk) =⊕ K
k=1αkqk iff pk∗
 qk∗
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The Continuity Axiom
Once again we will employ a continuity assumption that is basically
the same as the one we employed for the consumer model. Conti-
nuity means that the preferences are not overly sensitive to small
changes in the probabilities.
Continuity (C):
If p   q, then there are neighborhoods B(p) of p and B(q) of q (when
presented as vectors in R|Z|), such that
for all p  ∈ B(p) and q  ∈ B(q),p    q .
The continuity assumption implies (verify!) the following prop-
erty that is sometimes presented as an alternative deﬁnition of con-
tinuity:
C∗:
If p   q   r, then there exists α ∈ (0,1) such that
q ∼[ αp ⊕ (1 − α)r].
Let us check whether some of the examples we discussed earlier
satisfy these two axioms.























It follows that any such preference relation satisﬁes I. Since
the function U(p) is continuous in the probability vector, it
also satisﬁes C.
• Increasing the probability of a “good” consequence: Such a pref-
erence relation satisﬁes the two axioms since it can be repre-
sented by the expectation of v where v(z) = 1 for z ∈ G and
v(z) = 0 for z ∈ B.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 108 Page number 92
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• Extreme preference for certainty: This preference relation is con-
tinuous (as the function max{p1,...,pK} which represents it
is continuous in probabilities). It does not satisfy I since,
for example, although [z1]∼[ z2],1 /2[z1]⊕1/2[z1] 1/2[z1]⊕
1/2[z2].
• Lexicographic preferences: Such a preference relation satisﬁes I
but not C (an exercise!).
• The worst case: Such a preference relation does not satisfy C.I n
the two-prize case where v(z1)>v(z2), [z1] 1/2[z1]⊕1/2[z2].
ViewedaspointsinR2
+,wecanrewritethisas(1,0)   (1/2,1/2).
Anyneighborhoodof(1,0)containslotteriesthatarenotstrict-
lypreferredto(1/2,1/2)andthusC isnotsatisﬁed. Suchapref-
erence relation also does not satisfy I ([z1] [ z2] but 1/2[z1]⊕
1/2[z2]∼[ z2].)
Utility Representation
By Debreu’s theorem we know that for any relation  deﬁned on
the space of lotteries that satisﬁes C, there is a utility representation
U : L(Z) →  , continuous in the probabilities, such that p  q iff
U(p) ≥ U(q). We will use the above axioms to isolate a family of
preference relations and to derive a more structured utility function.
Theorem (vNM):
Let  be a preference relation over L(Z) satisfying I and C. There are
numbers (v(z))z∈Z such that
p  q iff U(p) =  z∈Zp(z)v(z) ≥ U(q) =  z∈Zq(z)v(z).
Note the distinction between U(p) (the utility number of the lot-
tery p) and v(z) (called the Bernoulli numbers or the vNM utilities).
The function v is a utility function representing the preferences on
Z and is the building block for the construction of U(p), a utility
function representing the preferences on L(Z). We will also often
say that v is a vNM utility function representing the preferences 
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For the proof of the theorem, we need the following lemma:
Lemma:
Let  be a preference over L(Z) satisfying Axiom I. Let x,y ∈ Z such
that [x] [ y] and 1 ≥ α>β≥ 0. Then
αx ⊕ (1 − α)y   βx ⊕ (1 − β)y.
Proof:
If either α = 1o rβ = 0, the claim is implied by I. Otherwise, by I,
αx ⊕ (1−α)y  [ y]. Using I again we get: αx ⊕ (1−α)y   (β/α)(αx ⊕
(1 − α)y) ⊕ (1−β/α)[y]=βx ⊕ (1−β)y.
Proof of the theorem:
Let M and m be the best and worst certain lotteries in L(Z).
Consider ﬁrst the case that M ∼ m. It follows from I∗ that p ∼ m
for any p and thus p ∼ q for all p,q ∈ L(Z). Choosing v(z) = 0 for all
z we have  z∈Zp(z)v(z) = 0 for all p ∈ L(Z). Thus, a constant utility
function represents .
Now consider that M   m.B yC∗ and the lemma, there is a single
number v(z) ∈[ 0,1] such that v(z)M ⊕ (1−v(z))m ∼[ z]. (For exam-
ple, v(M) = 1 and v(m) = 0). By I∗ we obtain that
p ∼ ( z∈Zp(z)v(z))M ⊕ (1 −  z∈Zp(z)v(z))m.
And by the lemma p  q iff  z∈Zp(z)v(z) ≥  z∈Zq(z)v(z).
The Uniqueness of vNM Utilities
The vNM utilities are unique up to positive afﬁne transformation
(namely, multiplicationbyapositivenumberandaddinganyscalar)
and are not invariant to arbitrary monotonic transformation. Con-
sider a preference relation  deﬁned over L(Z) and deﬁne v(z) as in
the proof above. Of course, deﬁning w(z) = αv(z) + β for all z (for
some α>0 and some β), the utility function W(p) =  z∈Zp(z)w(z)
represents .October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 110 Page number 94
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Furthermore, assume that W(p) =  zp(z)w(z) represents the pref-
erences  as well. We will show that w must be a positive afﬁne
transformation of v. To see this, let α>0 and β satisfy
w(M) = αv(M) + β and w(m) = αv(m) + β
(the existence of α>0 and β is guaranteed by v(M)>v(m) and
w(M)>w(m)). For any z ∈ Z we have [z]∼v(z)M ⊕ (1−v(z))m,s o
it must be that
w(z) = v(z)w(M) + (1−v(z))w(m)
= v(z)[αv(M) + β]+(1−v(z))[αv(m) + β]= αv(z) + β.
The Dutch Book Argument
There are those who consider expected utility maximization to be
a normative principle. One of the arguments made to support this
view is the following Dutch book argument. Assume that L1   L2
but that αL ⊕ (1 − α)L2   αL ⊕ (1 − α)L1. We can perform the fol-
lowing trick on the decision maker:
1. Take αL ⊕ (1 − α)L1 (we can describe this as a contingency with
random event E, which we both agree has probability 1 − α).
2. Take instead αL ⊕ (1 − α)L2, which you prefer (and you pay me
something...).
3. Let us agree to replace L2 with L1 in case E occurs (and you pay
me something now).
4. Note that you hold αL ⊕ (1 − α)L1.
5. Let us start from the beginning...
One possibility is to interpret the Dutch book as a “disequilibri-
um” in the decision maker’s mind. Whatever he decides to do, he
ﬁnds himself contradicting his own decision. If he has to choose
between the two lotteries and makes up his mind to take αL ⊕ (1 −
α)L1, he recalls that he prefers αL ⊕ (1 − α)L2, and if he is about to
choose αL ⊕ (1 − α)L2, he recalls that he will replace L2 by L1 if E
occurs.
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A Discussion of the Plausibility of the vNM Theory
Many experiments reveal systematic deviations from vNM assump-
tions. The most famous one is the Allais paradox. One version of it
(see Kahneman and Tversky 2000) is presented here as follows.
Choose between
L1 = 0.25[3,000]⊕0.75[0] and L2 = 0.2[4,000]⊕0.8[0]
and now choose between
L3 = 1[3,000] and L4 = 0.8[4,000]⊕0.2[0].
NotethatL1 = 0.25L3 ⊕ 0.75[0]andL2 = 0.25L4 ⊕ 0.75[0]. Axiom
I requires that the preference between L1 and L2 be respectively the
same as that between L3 and L4. However, a majority of people ex-
press the preferences L1 ≺ L2 and an even larger majority express the
preferences L3   L4. Among about 140 graduate students at Prince-
ton, Tel Aviv, and NYU (in 2002–4), although they were asked to
respond to the above two choice problems on line one after the
other, 67% chose L2 while 80% chose L3. This means that at least
47% of the students violated property I.
In my opinion, the last example demonstrates (again) the sensi-
tivity of preference to the framing of the alternatives. When the
lotteries L1 and L2 are presented as they are above, most prefer
L2. But, if we present L1 and L2 as the compound lotteries L1 =
0.25L3 ⊕ 0.75[0] and L2 = 0.25L4 ⊕ 0.75[0], most subjects prefer L1
to L2.
Comment:
In the proof of the vNM theorem we have seen that the indepen-
dence axiom implies that if one is indifferent between z and z , one
is also indifferent between z and any lottery with z and z  as its
prizes. This is not plausible in cases in which one takes into ac-
count the fairness of the random process that selects the prizes. For
example, consider a parent in a situation where he has one gift and
two children, M and Y (guess why I chose these letters). His options
are to choose a lottery L(p) that will award M the gift with probabil-
ity p and Y with probability 1 − p. The parent does not favor one
child over the other. The vNM approach “predicts” that he will beOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 112 Page number 96
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indifferent among all lotteries that determine who receives the gift,
while common sense tells us he will strictly prefer L(1/2).
Bibliographic Notes
Recommended readings: Kreps 1990, 72–81 (115–122); Mas-Colell et
al. 1995, chapter 6, A–B.
Expected utility theory is based on von Neumann and Morgen-
stern(1944). Kreps(1988)hasanexcellentpresentationofthemate-
rial. Machina (1987) remains a recommended survey of alternative
theories. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is a must reading for psy-
chological criticism of expected utility theory. More recent material
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Problem 1. (Standard)
Consider the following preference relations that were described in the text:
“The size of the support” and “Comparing the most likely prize.”
a. Check carefully whether they satisfy axioms I and C.
b. These preference relations are not immune to a certain “framing prob-
lem.” Explain.
Problem 2. (Standard. Based on Markowitz 1959.)
One way to construct preferences over lotteries with monetary prizes is by
evaluatingeachlotteryLonthebasisoftwonumbers, Ex(L), theexpectation
of L and var(L), L’s variance. Such a procedure may or may not be consistent
with vNM assumptions.
a. Showthatu(L) = Ex(L) − (1/4)var(L)inducesapreferencerelationthat
is not consistent with the vNM assumptions. (For example, consider
the mixtures of each of the lotteries [1] and 0.5[0]⊕0.5[4] with the
lottery 0.5[0]⊕0.5[2].)
b. Show that u(L) = Ex(L) − (Ex(L))2 − var(L) is consistent with vNM as-
sumptions.
Problem 3. (More difﬁcult. Based on Yaari 1987.)
In this problem you will encounter the functional of Quiggin and Yaari,
one of the proposed alternatives to expected utility theory. Consider a
world with the prizes z0,z1,…,zK. A decision maker attaches a number
v(zk) to each zk such that v(z0) = 0 < v(z1)<v(z2)<...<v(zK) and eval-
uates each lottery L by the number U(L) =  K
k=1f (GL(zk))[v(zk) − v(zk−1)],
where f :[ 0,1]→[ 0,1] is a continuous increasing function and GL(zk) =
 j≥kL(zj).( L(z) is the probability that the lottery L yields z and GL is the
“anti-distribution” of L.)
a. Verify that for f (x) = x, U(L) is the standard expected v-utility of L.
b. Show that the induced preference relation satisﬁes the continuity ax-
iom but may not satisfy the independence axiom.
c. What are the difﬁculties with a functional form of the type  zf (p(z))
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Problem 4. (Moderate)
A decision maker has a preference relation  over the space of lotteries L(Z)
having a set of prizes Z. On Sunday he learns that on Monday he will be
told whether he has to choose between L1 and L2 (probability 1 >α>0) or
between L3 and L4 (probability 1 − α). He will make his choice at that time.
Let us compare between two possible approaches the decision maker may
take.
Approach 1: He delays his decision to Monday (“why bother with the
decision now when I can make up my mind tomorrow....”).
Approach 2: He makes a contingent decision on Sunday regarding what
he will do on Monday, that is, he instructs himself what to do if he faces
the choice between L1 and L2 and what to do if he faces the choice between
L3 and L4 (“On Monday morning I will be so busy....”).
a. Formulate approach 2 as a choice between lotteries.
b. Show that if the preferences of the decision maker satisfy the indepen-
dence axiom, his choice under approach 2 will always be the same as
under approach 1.
Problem 5. (Difﬁcult. Bayesian updating.)
A decision maker has to choose an action from among a set A. The set of
consequencesisZ. Foreveryactiona ∈ Atheconsequencez∗ isrealizedwith
probability α, and any z ∈ Z −{ z∗} is realized with probability (1 − α)q(a,z).
a. Assume that once he has made his choice he is told that z∗ will not
occur and is given a chance to change his decision. Show that if the
decision maker obeys the Bayesian updating rule and follows vNM
axioms, he will not change his decision.
b. Show that this is not necessarily the case if he does not obey the
Bayesian rule or is using a nonexpected utility preference relation.
Problem 6. (Standard)
Assume there is a ﬁnite number of income levels and that the distribution
over income levels is deﬁned as the proportion of individuals at each level.
Inotherwords, wecanthinkofadistributionasalotteryoverincomelevels,
with the probability of outcomes representing the proportions at each level.
We often use the phrase “one distribution is more egalitarian than another.”
a. Why is the von Neumann–Morgenstern independence axiom inap-
propriate for characterizing this type of relation?
b. Suggest a property that is appropriate, in your opinion, as an axiom
for this type of relation. Give two examples of preference relationsOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 115 Page number 99
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that satisfy your property and express the desired relation in a logical
fashion.
Problem 7. (Difﬁcult. Based on Miyamoto, Wakker, Bleichrodt, and Peters
1998.)
A decision maker faces a trade-off between longevity and quality of life. His
preference relation ranks lotteries on the set of all certain outcomes of the
form (q,t), deﬁned as “a life of quality q and length t” (where q and t are
nonnegative numbers). Assume that the preference relation satisﬁes von
Neumann–Morgenstern assumptions and that it also satisﬁes
• Indifference between “high” and “low” quality of life when longevity
is 0.
• Expected longevity and quality of life are desirable.
a. Formalize the two assumptions.
b. Show that the preference relation derived from maximizing the expec-
tation of the function v(q)t, where v is a strictly increasing function
and v(q)>0 for all q, satisﬁes the assumptions.
c. Show that all preference relations satisfying the above assumptions
can be represented by an expected utility function of the form v(q)t,
where v is a positive and increasing function.
Problem 8. (Food for thought)
Consider a decision maker who systematically calculates that 2 + 3 = 6.
Construct a “money pump” argument against him. Discuss the argument.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 116 Page number 100
LECTURE 9
Risk Aversion
Lotteries with Monetary Prizes
We proceed to a discussion of a decision maker satisfying vNM as-
sumptions where the space of prizes Z is a set of real numbers and
a ∈ Z is interpreted as “receiving $a.” Note that in Lecture 8 we as-
sumed the set Z is ﬁnite; here, in contrast, we apply the expected
utility approach to a set that is inﬁnite. For simplicity we will still
only consider lotteries with ﬁnite support. In other words, in this
lecture, a lottery p is a real function on Z such that p(z) ≥ 0 for all
z ∈ Z, and there is a ﬁnite set Y such that

z∈Y p(z) = 1.
Wewillfollowourgeneralmethodologyandmakespecialassump-
tions that ﬁt the interpretation of the members of Z as sums of
money. Let [x] be the lottery that yields the prize x with certainty.
We will say that  satisﬁes monotonicity if a > b implies [a] [ b].
Thus, if u is a vNM utility function representing a monotonic pref-
erence relation, then u is a strictly increasing function.
An axiomatization (not presented here) of vNM preferences on an
inﬁnite space Z requires strengthening of the continuity assump-
tion so that if p   q, then small changes in the prizes, and not just
in probabilities, leave the preferences unchanged. From here on we
focus the discussion on preference relations over the space of lotter-
ies for which there is a continuous function u (referred to as a vNM
utility function), such that the preference relation is represented by
the function Eu(p) =

z∈Z p(z)u(z). This function assigns to the lot-
tery p the expectation of the random variable that receives the value
u(x) with a probability p(x).
The following argument, called the St. Petersburg Paradox, is some-
timespresentedasajustiﬁcationforassumingthatvNMutilityfunc-
tionsarebounded. Assumethatadecisionmakerhasanunbounded
vNM utility function u. Consider playing the following “trick” on
him:October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 117 Page number 101
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1. Assume he possesses wealth x0.
2. Offer him a lottery that will reduce his wealth to 0 with prob-
ability 1/2 and will increase his wealth to x1 with probability
1/2 so that u(x0)<[u(0) + u(x1)]/2. By the unboundedness of
u, there exists such an x1.
3. If he loses, you are happy. If he is lucky, a moment before
you give him x1, offer him a lottery that will give him x2 with
probability 1/2 and 0 otherwise, where x2 is such that u(x1)<
[u(0) + u(x2)]/2.
4. And so on...
Our decision maker will ﬁnd himself with wealth 0 with probabil-
ity 1!
First-Order Stochastic Domination
We say that p ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates q (written as pD1q)i f
p  q foranyonL(Z)satisfyingvNMassumptionsaswellasmono-
tonicity in money. That is, pD1q if Eu(p) ≥ Eu(q) for all increasing u.
Obviously, pD1q if the entire support of p is to the right of the entire
support of q. But, we are interested in a more interesting condition
on a pair of lotteries p and q, one that will be not only sufﬁcient,
but also necessary for p to ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate q.
For any lottery p and a number x, deﬁne G(p,x) =

z≥x p(z) (the
probability that the lottery p yields a prize at least as high as x).
Denote by F(p,x) the cumulative distribution function of p, that is,
F(p,x) = Probability{z|z < x}.
Claim:
pD1q iff for all x, G(p,x) ≥ G(q,x) (alternatively, pD1q iff for all x,
F(p,x) ≤ F(q,x)). (See ﬁg. 9.1.)
Proof:
Let x0 < x1 < x2 <...<xK be the prizes in the union of the supports




p(xk)u(xk) = u(x0) +

k≥1
G(p,xk)(u(xk) − u(xk−1)).October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 118 Page number 102
102 Lecture Nine
Figure 9.1
p ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates q.
Now, if G(p,xk) ≥ G(q,xk) for all k, then for all increasing u,
Eu(p) = u(x0) +

k≥1




G(q,xk)(u(xk) − u(xk−1)) = Eu(q).
Conversely, if there exists k∗ for which G(p,xk∗)<G(q,xk∗), then
wecanﬁndanincreasingfunctionu sothatEu(p)<Eu(q), bysetting
u(xk∗) − u(xk∗−1) to be very large and the other increments to be very
small.
We have just discussed the simplest example of questions of the
type: “Given a set of preference relations on L(Z), for what pairs
p,q ∈ L(Z) is p  q for all  in the set?” In the problem set you will
discuss another example of this kind of question.
Risk Aversion
We say that  is risk averse if for any lottery p, [Ep]  p.
Wewillseenowthatforadecisionmakerwithpreferencesobey-
ing the vNM axioms, risk aversion is closely related to the concavity
of the vNM utility function representing .October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 119 Page number 103
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First recall some basic properties of concave functions (if you are
not familiar with those properties, this will be an excellent oppor-
tunity for you to prove them yourself):
1. An increasing and concave function must be continuous (but
not necessarily differentiable).
2. The Jensen Inequality:I f u is concave, then for any ﬁnite se-






3. The Three Strings Lemma: For any a < b < c we have
[u(c) − u(b)]/(c − b) ≤[ u(c) − u(a)]/(c − a) ≤[ u(b) − u(a)]/(b − a).
4. If u is differentiable, then for any a < c, u (a) ≥ u (c), and thus
u  (x) ≤ 0 for all x.
Claim:
Let  be a preference on L(Z) represented by the vNM utility func-
tion u. The preference relation  is risk averse iff u is concave.
Proof:
Assume that u is concave. By the Jensen Inequality, for any lottery
p, u(E(p)) ≥ Eu(p) and thus [E(p)]  p.
Assume that  is risk averse and that u represents . For all α ∈
(0,1) and for all x,y ∈ Z, we have by risk aversion [αx + (1 − α)y] 
αx ⊕ (1 − α)y and thus u(αx + (1 − α)y) ≥ αu(x) + (1 − α)u(y), that
is, u is concave.
Certainty Equivalence and the Risk Premium
Let E(p) be the expectation of the lottery p, that is, E(p) =

z∈Z p(z)z.
Given a preference relation  over the space L(Z), the certainty equiv-
alence of a lottery p, CE(p), is a prize satisfying [CE(p)]∼p. (To justify
the existence of CE(p) we need to assume that  is monotonic and
continuous in the sense that if p   q, the inequality is maintained if
we change both lotteries’ probabilities and prizes a “little bit”). TheOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 120 Page number 104
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Figure 9.2
CE and risk premium.
risk premium of p is the difference R(P) = E(p) − CE(p). By deﬁnition,
the preferences are risk averse if and only if R(p) ≥ 0 for all p. (See
ﬁg. 9.2.)
The “More Risk Averse” Relation
We wish to formalize the statement “one decision maker is more
risk averse than another.” To understand the logic of the following
deﬁnitions let us start with an analogous phrase: What is the mean-
ing of the statement “A is more war averse than B”? One possible
meaning is that whenever A is ready to go to war, B is as well. An-
other possible meaning is that when facing the threat of war, A is
ready to agree to a less attractive compromise in order to prevent
war than B. The following two deﬁnitions are analogous to these
two interpretations.
1. The preference relation 1 is more risk averse than 2 if for any
lottery p and degenerate lottery c, p 1 c implies that p 2 c.
In case the preferences are monotonic, we have a second deﬁni-
tion:
2. The preference relation 1 is more risk averse than 2 if CE1(p) ≤
CE2(p) for all p.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 121 Page number 105
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Figure 9.3
1 is more risk averse than 2.
In case the preferences satisfy vNM assumptions, we have a third
deﬁnition:
3. Let u1 and u2 be vNM utility functions representing 1 and 2,
respectively. Thepreferencerelation1 ismoreriskaversethan
2 if the function ϕ, deﬁned by u1(t) = ϕ(u2(t)), is concave.
I ﬁnd deﬁnition (1) particularly attractive since it is meaningful
in any space of prizes (not only those in which consequences are
numerical) and for a general set of preferences (and not only those
satisfying vNM assumptions). (See ﬁg. 9.3.)
Claim:
If both 1 and 2 are preference relations on L(Z) represented by
increasing and continuous vNM utility functions, then the three
deﬁnitions are equivalent.
Proof:
• If (2), then (1).
Assume (2). Then, if p 1 [c], it has to be that [CE1(p)] 1 [c]
and thus CE1(p) ≥ c, which implies also that CE2(p) ≥ c, that
is, p 2 [c].October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 122 Page number 106
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• If (3) then (2).
By deﬁnition, Eui(p) = ui(CEi(p)). Thus, CEi(p) = u
−1
i (Eui(p)).
If ϕ = u1u
−1
2 is concave, then by the Jensen Inequality:
u1(CE2(p)) = u1(u
−1










p(xk)u1(xk) = E(u1(p)) = u1(CE1(p)).
Thus, CE2(p) ≥ CE1(p).
• If (1), then (3).
Consider three numbers u2(x)<u2(y)<u2(z) in the range of
u2 and let λ ∈ (0,1) satisfy u2(y) = λu2(x) + (1 − λ)u2(z). Let us
see that u1(y) ≥ λu1(x) + (1 − λ)u1(z).
If u1(y)<λ u1(x) + (1 − λ)u1(z), then for some w > y close
enough to y, we have both w ≺1 λx ⊕ (1 − λ)z and w  2 λx ⊕
(1 − λ)z, which contradicts (1). Thus, y 1 λx ⊕ (1 − λ)z and
u1(y) ≥ λu1(x) + (1 − λ)u1(z), from which it follows that
ϕ(u2(y)) ≥ λϕ(u2(x)) + (1 − λ)ϕ(u2(z)). Thus, ϕ is concave.
The Coefﬁcient of Absolute Risk Aversion
Thefollowingisanotherdeﬁnitionoftherelation“moreriskaverse”
applied to the case in which vNM utility functions are differentiable:
4. Let u1 and u2 be differentiable vNM utility functions repre-
senting 1 and 2, respectively. The preference relation 1 is




The number r(x) =− u  (x)/u (x) is called the coefﬁcient of absolute
risk aversion of u at x. We will see that a higher coefﬁcient of absolute
risk aversion means a more risk-averse decision maker.
To see that (3) and (4) are equivalent, note the following chain of
equivalences:
• Deﬁnition (3) (that is, u1u
−1
2 is concave) is satisﬁed iff
• the function d/dt[u1(u
−1











2(x) is nonincreasing in x (since u
−1
2 (t) is increasing





1(x) − logu 
2(x) is nonincreasing in x iff
• the derivative of logu 
1(x) − logu 
2(x) is nonpositive iff
• r2(x) − r1(x) ≤ 0 for all x where ri(x) =− u  
i (x)/u 
i(x) iff
• deﬁnition (4) is satisﬁed.
For a better understating of the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aver-
sion, it is useful to look at the preferences on the restricted domain
of lotteries of the type (x1,x2) = px1 ⊕ (1 − p)x2, where the probabil-
ity p is ﬁxed. Denote by u a differentiable vNM utility function that
represents a risk-averse preference.
Let x2 = ψ(x1) be the function describing the indifference curve
through (t,t), the point representing [t]. It follows from risk aver-
sion that all lotteries with expectation t, that is, all lotteries on
the line {(x1,x2)| px1 + (1 − p)x2 = t}, are not above the indifference
curve through (t,t). Thus, ψ (x1) =− p/(1 − p).
By deﬁnition of u as a vNM utility function representing the pref-
erencesoverthespaceoflotteries,wehavepu(x1) + (1 − p)u(ψ(x1)) =
u(t). Taking the derivative with respect to x1, we obtain pu (x1) +
(1−p)u (ψ(x1))ψ (x1) = 0. Taking the derivative with respect to x1
once again, we obtain
pu  (x1) + (1−p)u  (ψ(x1))[ψ (x1)]2 + (1 − p)u (ψ(x1))ψ  (x1) = 0.
At x1 = t we have
pu  (t) + u  (t)p2/(1−p) + (1−p)u (t)ψ  (t) = 0.
Therefore,
ψ  (t) =− u  (t)/u (t)[p/(1−p)2]=r(t)[p/(1−p)2].
That is, the second derivative of the indifference curve through the
certain lottery t is r(t)[p/(1−p)2].
Notethatonthisrestrictedspaceoflotteries, 1 ismoreriskaverse
than 2 in the sense of deﬁnition (1) iff the indifference curve of 1
through (t,t), denoted by ψ1, is never below the indifference curve
of 2 through (t,t), denoted by ψ2. Combined with ψ 
1(t) = ψ 
2(t),
we obtain that ψ  
1(t) ≥ ψ  
2(t) and thus r2(t) ≤ r1(t). (See ﬁg. 9.4.)
The Doctrine of Consequentialism
Conduct the following “thought experiment”:October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 124 Page number 108
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Figure 9.4
1 is more risk averse than 2.
You have $2000 in your bank account. You have to choose between
1. a sure loss of $500
and
2. a lottery in which you lose $1000 with probability 1/2 and lose
0 with probability 1/2.
What is your choice?
Now assume that you have $1000 in your account and that you
have to choose between
3. a certain gain of $500
and
4. a lottery in which you win $1000 with probability 1/2 and win
0 with probability 1/2.
What is your choice?
In the ﬁrst case, most people preferred the lottery to the certain
prize (chose (2)), while in the second case most people preferred
the sure prize (chose (3)). Such a preference does not conﬂict with
expected utility theory if we interpret a prize to reﬂect a “monetary
change.” However, if we assume that the decision maker takes the
ﬁnal wealth levels to be his prizes, we have a problem: in terms of
ﬁnal wealth levels, both choices can be presented as being between
a sure prize of $1500 and a lottery that yields $2000 or $1000 with
probability 1/2 each.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 125 Page number 109
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Nevertheless, in the economic literature it is usually assumed that
adecisionmaker’spreferencesoverwealthchangesareinducedfrom
his preferences with regard to “ﬁnal wealth levels.” Formally, when
starting with wealth w, denote by w the decision maker’s prefer-
ences over lotteries in which the prizes are interpreted as “changes”
in wealth. By the doctrine of consequentialism all relations w are de-
rived from the same preference relation, , deﬁned over the “ﬁnal
wealth levels” by p w q iff w + p  w + q (where w + p is the lottery
that awards a prize w + x with probability p(x)). If  is represented
by a vNM utility function u, this doctrine implies that for all w, the
function vw(x) = u(w + x) is a vNM utility function representing the
preferences w.
Invariance to Wealth
We say that the preference relation  exhibits invariance to wealth
(in the literature it is often called constant absolute risk aversion)i f
the induced preference relation w is independent of w, that is,
(w + L1)  (w + L2) is true or false independent of w.
We will see that if u is a continuous vNM utility function repre-
senting preferences , which exhibit risk aversion and invariance to
wealth, then u must be exponential.
Letusﬁrstconﬁneourselvestothe  − grid prizespace,Z ={ x|x =
n  for some integer n}. This domain has a special meaning when
we take   to be the smallest (indivisible) unit of money.
By continuity of u, for any wealth level x there is a number q such
that (1 − q)(x −  ) ⊕ q(x +  ) ∼ x. By the invariance to wealth, q is
independentofx. Thus,wehaveu(x +  ) − u(x) = ((1 − q)/q)[u(x) −
u(x −  )] for all x. This means that the increments in the function
u, when x is increased by  , constitute a geometric sequence with a
factor of (1 − q)/q (where q might depend on  ). We conclude that
the function u, deﬁned on the   − grid, must be an afﬁne transfor-
mation of ((1 − q)/q)x/ .
Let us now return to the case of Z = and look at the preferences
over the restricted space of all lotteries of the type (x1,x2) = px1 ⊕
(1 − p)x2 for some arbitrary ﬁxed probability number p ∈ (0,1).A
necessary condition for  to exhibit constant absolute risk aver-
sion is that the indifference curve through (t,t) is the same as that
through (0,0), shifted in the direction of (t,t). In other words,October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 126 Page number 110
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denoting the indifference through (t,t) by x2 = ψt(x1), we have
ψt(x1) = ψ0(x1 − t) + t.
Assuming that the function u is differentiable, we derive that
ψ  
t (t) = ψ  
0(0). We have already seen that ψ  
t (t) =− [ p/(1−p)2]
[u  
i (t)/u 
i(t)] and thus there exists a constant α such that
−u  (t)/u (t) = α for all t. This implies that [logu (t)]  =− α for all
t and logu (t) =− αt + β for some β. It follows that u (t) = e−αt+β.I f
α = 0, the function u(t) must be linear (implying risk neutrality). If
α  = 0, it must be that u(t) = ce−αt + d for some c and d.
To conclude, if u is a vNM continuous utility function represent-
ing preferences that are monotonic and exhibit both risk aversion
and invariance to wealth, thenu is an afﬁne transformation of either
the function t or a function −e−αt (with α>0).
Critique of the Doctrine of Consequentialism
Denote by 1/2(−D) ⊕ 1/2(+G) the lottery in which there is an equal
probability of gaining $G and losing $D. Consider a risk-averse de-
cision maker who likes money, obeys expected utility theory, and
adheres to the doctrine of consequentialism. Matthew Rabin noted
that if such a decision maker turns down the lottery L = 1/2(−10) ⊕
1/2(+11), at any wealth level between $0 and $5000 (a quite plau-
sible assumption), then at the wealth level $4000 he must reject the
lottery 1/2(−100) ⊕ 1/2(+71000) (a quite ridiculous conclusion).
The intuition for this observation is quite simple. Let   be the
marginal utility of one dollar at the wealth level w.I fL is rejected
at w, then it must be that the marginal utility level at w + 21 is not
more than (21/22) . To see this, note that the marginal utility at
w + 21 is (by the concavity of u) not greater than [u(w + 21) − u(w +
10)]/11. Since L is rejected in w, u(w + 10) ≥[ u(w) + u(w + 21)]/2
and thus the marginal utility at w + 21 is not greater than
{u(w + 21) −[ u(w + 21) + u(w + 0)]/2}/11
=[ u(w + 21) − u(w + 0)]/22 ≤ (21/22) .
Thus, the sequence of marginal utilities within the domain of
wealth levels in which L is rejected falls at a geometric rate. This
implies that for the lottery 1/2(−D) ⊕ 1/2(+G) to be accepted even
for a relatively low D, one would need a huge G.
What conclusions should we draw from this observation? In my
opinion, in contrast to what some scholars claim, this is not a refu-October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 127 Page number 111
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tation of expected utility theory. Rabin’s argument relies on the
doctrine of consequentialism, which is not a part of expected utility
theory. Expected utility theory is invariant to the interpretation of
the prizes. Independently of the theory of decision making under
uncertainty that we use, the set of prizes should be the set of con-
sequences in the mind of the decision maker. Thus, it is equally
reasonable to assume the consequences are “wealth changes” or “ﬁ-
nal wealth levels.”
I treat Rabin’s argument as further evidence of the empirically
problematic nature of the doctrine of consequentialism according
to which the decision maker makes all decisions having in mind a
preference relation over the same set of ﬁnal consequences. It also
demonstrateshowcarefullyweshouldtreadwhentryingtoestimate
real life agents’ utility functions. The practice of estimating an eco-
nomic agent’s risk aversion parameters for small lotteries might lead
to misleading conclusions if such estimates are used to characterize
the decision maker’s preferences regarding lotteries over large sums.
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Problem 1. (Standard. Based on Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970.)
We say that p second-order stochastically dominates q and denote it by pD2q if
p  q for all preferences  satisfying the vNM assumptions, monotonicity
and risk aversion.
a. Explain why pD1q implies pD2q.
b. Let p and ε be lotteries. Deﬁne p + ε to be the lottery that yields the
prize t with the probability  α+β=tp(α)ε(β). Interpret p + ε. Show that
if ε is a lottery with expectation 0, then for all p, pD2(p + ε).
c. (More difﬁcult) Show that pD2q if and only if for all t < K, t
k=0
[G(p,xk+1) − G(q,xk+1)][xk+1 − xk]≥0 where x0 <...<xK are all the
prizes in the support of either p or q and G(p,x) =  z≥xp(z).
Problem 2. (Standard. Based on Slovic and Lichtenstein 1968.)
Consideraphenomenoncalledpreferencereversal. LetL1 = 8/9[$4]⊕1/9[$0]
and L2 = 1/9[$40]⊕8/9[$0].
a. What is the maximal amount you are willing to pay for L1? For L2?
b. What lottery do you prefer?
c. Discussthe“typical”answerthatranksL1 assuperiortoL2 butattaches
a lower value to L1 (see Slovic, Tversky and Kahneman 1990).
Problem 3. (Standard)
Consider a consumer’s preference over K-tuples of K uncertain assets. De-
note the random return on the kth asset by Zk. Assume that the random
variables (Z1,...,ZK) are independent and take positive values with proba-
bility 1. If the consumer buys the combination of assets (x1,...,xK) and if
the vector of realized returns is (z1,...,zK), then the consumer’s total wealth
is
K
k=1 zkxk. Assume that the consumer satisﬁes vNM assumptions, that is,
there is a function v (over the sum of his returns) so that he maximizes the
expected value of v. Assume that v is increasing and concave. The con-
sumer preferences over the space of the lotteries induce preferences on the
space of investments. Show that the induced preferences are monotonic
and convex.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 129 Page number 113
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Problem 4. (Standard. Based on Rubinstein 2002.)
Adam lives in the Garden of Eden and eats only apples. Time in the garden
is discrete (t = 1,2,...) and apples are eaten only in discrete units. Adam
possesses preferences over the set of streams of apple consumption. Assume
that Adam:
a. Likes to eat up to 2 apples a day and cannot bear to eat 3 apples a day.
b. Is impatient. He will be delighted to increase his consumption at day
t from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 2 apples at the expense of an apple he is
promised a day later.
c. At any period in which he does not have an apple, he prefers to get
one apple immediately in exchange for two apples tomorrow.
d. Cares only about his consumption in the ﬁrst 120 years of his life.
Show that if (poor) Adam is offered a stream of 2 apples starting in period
19 for the rest of his life (assuming he does not expect to live more than
120 years), he would be willing to exchange that offer for one apple given




When a rational decision maker forms a preference relation, it is
often on the basis of more primitive relations. For example, the
choice of a PC may depend on considerations such as “size of mem-
ory,” “ranking by PC magazine,” and “price.” Each of these consid-
erations expresses a preference relation on the set of PCs. In this
lecture we look at some of the logical properties and problems that
arise in the formation of preferences on the basis of more primitive
preference relations.
Although the aggregation of preference relations can be thought
of in a context of a single individual’s decision making, the clas-
sic context in which preference aggregation is discussed is “social
choice,” where the “will of the people” is thought of as an aggrega-
tion of the preference relations held by members of society.
The foundations of social choice theory lie in the “Paradox of
Voting.” Let X ={ a,b,c} be a set of alternatives. Consider a society
thatconsistsofthreememberscalled1, 2, and3. TheirrankingsofX
are a  1 b  1 c; b  2 c  2 a, and c  3 a  3 b. A natural criterion for
the determination of collective opinion on the basis of individuals’
preference relations is the majority rule. According to the majority
rule, a   b, b   c, and c   a, which conﬂicts with the transitivity
of the social ordering. Note that although the majority rule does
not induce a transitive social relation for all proﬁles of individuals’
preferencerelations, transitivityisguaranteedifwerestrictourselves
to a smaller domain of proﬁles (see problem 3 in the problem set).
The interest in social choice in economics is motivated by the
recognition that explicit methods for the aggregation of preference
relations are essential for doing any welfare economics. The theory is
also related to the design of voting systems, which are methods for
determining social action on the basis of individuals’ preferences.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 131 Page number 115
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The Basic Model
A basic model of social choice consists of the following:
• X: a set of social alternatives.
• N: a ﬁnite set of individuals (denote the number of elements
in N by n).
•  i: individual i’s linear ordering on X (a linear ordering is a
preference relation with no indifferences, i.e., for no x  = y,
x ∼i y).
• Proﬁle:A n n-tuple of orderings ( 1,..., n) interpreted as a
certain “state of society.”
• SWF (Social Welfare Function): A function that assigns a single
(social) preference (not necessarily a linear ordering) to every
proﬁle.
Note that
1. The assumption that the domain of an SWF includes only strict
preferences is made only for simplicity of presentation.
2. An SWF attaches a preference relation to every possible proﬁle
and not just to a single proﬁle.
3. The SWF aggregation of preference relations is required to pro-
duce a complete preference relation. An alternative concept,
called Social Choice Function, attaches a social alternative, in-
terpreted as the society’s choice, to every proﬁle of preference
relations.
4. An SWF aggregates only ordinal preference relations. The
framework does not allow us to make a statement such as “the
society prefers a to b since agent 1 prefers b to a but agent 2
prefers a to b much more.”
5. In this model we cannot express a consideration of the type “I
prefer what society prefers.”
6. The elements in X are social alternatives. Thus, an individual’s
preferences may exhibit considerations of fairness and concern
about other individuals’ well-being.
Examples
Let us consider some examples of aggregation procedures. We will
often use  as a short form of F( 1,..., n).October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 132 Page number 116
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1. F( 1,..., n) = ∗ for some ordering ∗ . (This is a degenerate
SWF that does not account for the individuals’ preferences.)
2. Deﬁne x → z if a majority of individuals prefer x to z. Order
the alternatives by the number of “victories” they score, that
is, x  y if |{z|x → z} |≥| { z|y → z}|.
3. For X ={ a,b}, a  b unless 2/3 of the individuals prefer b to a.
4. “The anti-dictator”: There is an individual i so that x is preferred
to y if and only if y  i x.
5. Deﬁne d( ; 1,..., n) as the number of (x,y,i) for which x  i
y and y   x. The function d can be interpreted as the sum
of the distances between the preference relation   and the n
preference relations of the individuals. Choose F( 1,..., n) to
be an ordering that minimizes d( ; 1,..., n) (ties are broken
arbitrarily).
6. Let F( 1,..., n) be the ordering that is the most common
among ( 1,..., n) (with ties broken in some predetermined
way).
Axioms
Once again we use the axiomatization methodology. We suggest a
set of axioms on social welfare functions and study their implica-
tions. Let F be an SWF.
Condition Par (Pareto):
For all x,y ∈ X and for every proﬁle ( i)i∈N,i fx  i y for all i then
x   y.
The Pareto axiom requires that if all individuals prefer one alter-
native over the other, then the social preferences agree with the
individuals’.
Condition IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives):
For any pair x,y ∈ X and any two proﬁles (  i)i∈N and (   
i )i∈N if for
all i, x  i y iff x   
i y, then x  y iff x   y.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 133 Page number 117
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The IIA condition requires that if two proﬁles agree on the relative
rankings of two particular alternatives, then the social preferences
attached to the two proﬁles also agree in their relative ranking of
the two alternatives.
Notice that IIA allows an SWF to apply one criterion when com-
paring a to b and another when comparing c to d. For example,
the simple social preference between a and b can be determined ac-
cording to majority rule while that between c and d requires a 2/3
majority.
Condition IIA is sufﬁcient for Arrow’s theorem. However, for the
sake of simplifying the proof in this presentation, we will make do
with a stronger requirement:
Condition I∗ (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives + Neutrality):
For all a,b,c,d ∈ X, and for any proﬁles   and    if for all i,a  i
b iff c   
i d, then a  b iff c   d.
In other words, in addition to what is required by IIA, condition
I∗ requires that the criterion that determines the social preference
between a and b be applied to any pair of alternatives.
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Theorem (Arrow):
If |X|≥3, then any SWF F that satisﬁes conditions Par and I∗ is dic-
tatorial, that is, there is some i∗ such that F( 1,..., n) ≡ i∗ .
We can break the theorem’s assumptions into four: Par, I∗, Transi-
tivity (of the social ordering), and |X|≥3. Before we move on to the
proof, let us show that the assumptions are independent. Namely, for
eachofthefourassumptions, wegiveanexampleofanondictatorial
SWF, demonstrating the theorem would not hold if that assumption
were omitted.
• Par: An anti-dictator SWF satisﬁes I∗ but not Par.
• I∗: Consider the Borda Rule. Let w(1)>w(2)>...>w(|X|)
be a ﬁxed proﬁle of weights. Say that i assigns to x the scoreOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 134 Page number 118
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w(k) if x appears in the k’th place in  i. Attach to x the sum
of the weights assigned to x by the n individuals and rank the
alternatives by those sums. The Borda rule is an SWF satisfying
Par but not I∗.
• Transitivity of the Social Order: The majority rule satisﬁes all
assumptions but can induce a relation which is not transitive.
• |X|≥3: For |X|=2 the majority rule satisﬁes Par and I∗ and
induces (a trivial) transitive relation.
Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Let F be an SWF that satisﬁes Par and I∗. Hereinafter, we denote the
relation F( 1,..., n) by .
Given the SWF we say that
• a coalition G is decisive if for all x,y, [for all i ∈ G, x  i y] implies
[x   y], and
• a coalition G is almost decisive if for all x,y, [for all i ∈ G, x  i y
and for all j / ∈ Gy j x] implies [x   y].
Note that if G is decisive it is almost decisive since the “almost
decisiveness” refers only to the subset of proﬁles where all members
of G prefer x to y and all members of N − G prefer y to x.
Field Expansion Lemma:
If G is almost decisive, then G is decisive.
Proof:
We have to show that for any x,y and for any proﬁle (  
i)i∈N for
which x   
i y for all i ∈ G, the preference F(  
1,...,  
n) determines x
to be superior to y.B y I∗ it is sufﬁcient to show that for one pair
of social alternatives a and b, and for one proﬁle ( i)i∈N that agrees
withtheproﬁle(  
i)i∈N onthepair{a,b}, thepreferenceF( 1,..., n)
determines a to be preferred to b.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 135 Page number 119
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Let c be a third alternative. Let ( i)i∈N be a proﬁle satisfying a  i b
iff a   
i b for all i, and for all i ∈ G, a  i c  i b  i x for every x ∈ X −
{a,b,c} and for all j / ∈ G, c  j y  j x for every y ∈{ a,b} and for every
x ∈ X −{ a,b,c}.
Since G is almost decisive, a   c.B yPar, c   b, therefore, a   b by
transitivity.
Group Contraction Lemma:
If G is decisive and |G|≥2, then there exists G  ⊂ G such that G  is
decisive.
Proof:
Let G = G1 ∪ G2, where G1 and G2 are nonempty and G1 ∩ G2 =∅ .
By the Field Expansion Lemma it is enough to show that G1 or G2
is almost decisive.
Take three alternatives a,b, and c and a proﬁle of preference rela-
tions ( i)i∈N satisfying
• for all i ∈ G1, c  i a  i b, and
• for all i ∈ G2, a  i b  i c, and
• for all other i, b  i c  i a.
If G1 is not almost decisive, then there are x and y and a proﬁle
(  
i)i∈N suchthatx   
i y foralli ∈ G1 andy   
i xforalli / ∈ G1, suchthat
F(  
1,...,  
n) determines y to be at least as preferable as x. Therefore,
by I∗, b  c.
Similarly, if G2 is not almost decisive, then c  a. Thus, by transi-
tivity b  a, but since G is decisive, a   b, a contradiction. Thus, G1
or G2 is almost decisive.
Proof of the Theorem:
By Par, the set N is decisive. By the Group Contraction Lemma,
every decisive set that includes more than one member has a proper
subsetthatisdecisive. Thus, thereisaset{i∗}thatisdecisive, namely,
F( 1,..., n) ≡ i∗.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 136 Page number 120
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Related Issues
Arrow’s theorem was the starting point for a huge literature. We
mention three other impossibility results.
1. Monotonicity is another axiom that has been widely discussed
in the literature. Consider a “change” in a proﬁle so that an alterna-
tive a, which individual i ranked below b, is now ranked by i above
b. Monotonicity requires that there is no alternative c such that
this change deteriorates the ranking of a vs. c. Muller and Satterth-
waite (1977)’s theorem shows that the only SWF’s satisfying Par and
monotonicity are dictatorships.
2. An SWF speciﬁes a preference relation for every proﬁle. A
social choice function attaches an alternative to every proﬁle. The
most striking theorem proved in this framework is the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem. It states that any social choice function C
satisfying the condition that it is never worthwhile for an individual
to mispresent his preferences, namely, it is never that C( 1,...,  
i
,..., n)  i C( 1,..., i,..., n), is a dictatorship.
3. Another related concept is the following.
Let Ch( 1,..., n) be a function that assigns a choice function to
every proﬁle of orderings on X. We say that Ch satisﬁes unanimity
if for every ( 1,..., n) and for any x,y ∈ A,i fy  i x for all i then,
x / ∈ Ch( 1,..., n)(A).
We say that Ch is invariant to the procedure if, for every proﬁle ( 1
,..., n) and for every choice set A, the following two “approaches”
lead to the same outcome:
a. Partition A into two sets A  and A  . Choose an element from
A  and an element from A   and then choose one element from
the two choices.
b. Choose an element from the unpartitioned set A.
Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001) show that only dictatorships
satisfy both unanimity and invariance to the procedure.
Bibliographic Notes
Recommended readings: Kreps 1990, chapter 5; Mas-Colell et al.
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This lecture focuses mainly on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem,
one of the most famous results in economics, proved by Arrow in his
Ph.D. dissertation and published in 1951 (see the classic book Arrow
1963). Social choice theory is beautifully introduced in Sen (1970).
TheproofbroughthereisoneofmanyforArrow’sImpossibilityThe-
orem (see Kelly 1988). Reny (2001) provides an elementary proof
that demonstrates the strong logical link between Arrow’s theorem
and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 138 Page number 122
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Problem 1. (Moderately difﬁcult. Based on May 1952.)
Assume that the set of social alternatives, X, includes only two alternatives.
Deﬁne a social welfare function to be a function that attaches a preference
to any proﬁle of preferences (allow indifference for the SWF and the indi-
viduals’ preference relations). Consider the following axioms:
• Anonymity If σ is a permutation of N and if p ={i }i∈N and p  ={ 
i
}i∈N are two proﬁles of preferences on X so that  
σ(i)= i, then  (p) =
 (p ).
• Neutrality For any preference i deﬁne (− i) as the preference satis-
fying x(− i)y iff y i x. Then  ({− i }i∈N) =− ({ i }i∈N).
• Positive Responsiveness If the proﬁle {  
i }i∈N is identical to { i }i∈N with
the exception that for one individual j either (x ∼j y and x   
j y)o r
(y  j x and x ∼ 
j y) and if x  y then x    y.
a. Interpret the axioms.
b. Does anonymity imply non-dictatorship?
c. Show that the majority rule satisﬁes all axioms.
d. Prove May’s theorem by which the majority rule is the only SWF sat-
isfying the above axioms.
e. Are the above three axioms independent?
Problem 2. (Moderately difﬁcult)
N individuals choose a single object from among a set X. We are interested
in functions that aggregate the individuals’ recommendations (not prefer-
ences, just recommendations!) into a social decision (i.e., F : XN → X).
Discuss the following axioms:
• Par: If all individuals recommend x∗ then the society chooses x∗.
• I: If the same individuals support an alternative x ∈ X in two proﬁles
of recommendations, then x is chosen in one proﬁle if and only if it
chosen in the other.
a. Show that if X includes at least three elements, then the only aggre-
gation method that satisﬁes P and I is a dictatorship.
b. Show the necessity of the three conditions P, I, and |X|≥3 for this
conclusion.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 139 Page number 123
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Problem 3. (Easy)
Assume that the set of alternatives, X, is the interval [0,1] and that each
individual’s preference is single-peaked, i.e., for each i there is an alternative
a∗
i such that if a∗
i ≥ b > c or c > b ≥ a∗
i , then b  i c.
a. Provide an interpretation of single-peaked preferences.
b. Show that for any odd n, if we restrict the domain of preferences
to single-peaked preferences, then the majority rule induces a “well-
behaved” SWF.
Problem 4. (Moderately difﬁcult. Based on Kasher and Rubinstein 1997.)
Who is an economist? Departments of economics are often sharply divided
over this question. Investigate the approach according to which the deter-
mination of who is an economist is treated as an aggregation of the views
held by department members on this question.
Let N ={ 1,...,n} be a group of individuals (n ≥ 3). Each i ∈ N “sub-
mits” a set Ei,aproper subset of N, which is interpreted as the set of “real
economists” in his view. An aggregation method F is a function that as-
signs a proper subset of N to each proﬁle (Ei)i=1,...,n of proper subsets of N.
F(E1,...,En) is interpreted as the set of all members of N who are considered
by the group to be economists. (Note that we require that all opinions be
proper subsets of N.)
Consider the following axioms on F:
• Consensus If j ∈ Ei for all i ∈ N, then j ∈ F(E1,...,En).
• Independence If (E1,...,En) and (G1,...,Gn) are two proﬁles of views
so that for all i ∈ N,[ j ∈ Ei if and only if j ∈ F(G1,...,Gn)].
a. Interpret the two axioms.
b. Find one aggregation method that satisﬁes Consensus but not Inde-
pendence and one that satisﬁes Independence but not Consensus.
c. (Difﬁcult) Provide a proof similar to that of Arrows’ Impossibility The-
orem of the claim that the only aggregation methods that satisfy the
above two axioms are those for which there is a member i∗ such that
F(E1,...,En) ≡ Ei∗.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 140 Page number 124
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The following is a collection of questions I have given in exams
during the last few years.
Problem 1 (Princeton 2002)
Consider a consumer with a preference relation in a world with two
goods, X (an aggregated consumption good) and M (“membership
in a club,” for example), which can be consumed or not. In other
words, the consumption of X can be any nonnegative real number,
while the consumption of M must be either 0 or 1.
Assume that consumer preferences are strictly monotonic, con-
tinuous, and satisfy the following property:
Property E: For every x there is y such that (y,0)   (x,1) (that is,
there is always some amount of money that can compensate
for the loss of membership).
1. Show that any consumer’s preference relation can be repre-
sented by a utility function of the type
u(x,m) =

xi f m = 0
x + g(x) if m = 1
.
2. (Less easy) Show that the consumer’s preference relation can
also be represented by a utility function of the type
u(x,m) =

f (x) if m = 0
f (x) + vi fm = 1
.
3. Explain why continuity and strong monotonicity (without
property E) are not sufﬁcient for (1).
4. Calculate the consumer’s demand function.
5. Taking the utility function to be of the form described in (1),
derive the consumer’s indirect utility function. For the case
where the function g is differentiable, verify the Roy equality
with respect to commodity M.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 141 Page number 125
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Problem 2 (Princeton 2001)
A consumer has to make his decision before he is informed whether
a certain event, which is expected with probability α, happened or
not. He assigns a vNM utility v(x) to the consumption of the bundle
x in case the event occurs, and a vNM utility w(x) to the consump-
tion of x should the event not occur. The consumer maximizes
his expected utility. Both v and w satisfy the standard assumptions
about the consumer. Assume also that v and w are concave.
1. Show that the consumer’s preference relation is convex.
2. Findaconnectionbetweentheconsumer’sindirectutilityfunc-
tion and the indirect utility functions derived from v and w.
3. A new commodity appears on the market: “A discrete piece
of information that tells the consumer whether the event oc-
curred or not.” The commodity can be purchased prior to the
consumption decision. Use the indirect utility functions to
characterize the demand function for the new commodity.
Problem 3 (Princeton 2001)
1. Deﬁne a formal concept for “1 is closer to 0 than 2.”
2. Apply your deﬁnition to the class of preference relations rep-
resented by U1 = tU2 + (1 − t)U0, where the function Ui repre-
sents i (i = 0,1,2).
3. Consider the above deﬁnition in the consumer context. De-
note by xi
k(p,w) the demand function of i for good k. Is it true





k(p,w)| for any commodity k and for every price
vector p and wealth level w?
Problem 4 (Princeton 1997)
A decision maker forms preferences over the set X of all possible
distributions of a population over two categories (like living in two
locations). An element in X is a vector (x1,x2) where xi ≥ 0 and
x1 + x2 = 1. The decision maker has two considerations in mind:
• He thinks that if x  y, then for any z, the mixture of α ∈[ 0,1]
of x with (1 − α) of z should be at least as good as the mixture
of α of y with (1 − α) of z.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 142 Page number 126
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• He is indifferent between a distribution that is fully concen-
trated in location 1 and one which is fully concentrated in
location 2.
1. Show that the only preference relation that is consistent with
the two principles is the degenerate indifference relation (x ∼ y
for any x,y ∈ X).
2. The decision maker claims that you are wrong as his preference
relation is represented by a utility function |x1 − 1/2|. Why is
he wrong?
Problem 5 (Princeton 2000. Based on Fishburn and Rubinstein 1982.)
Let X =  + ×{ 0,1,2,...}, where (x,t) is interpreted as receiving $x
at time t. A preference relation on X has the following properties:
• There is indifference between receiving $0 at time 0 and re-
ceiving $0 at any other time.
• For any positive amount of money, it is better to receive it as
soon as possible.
• Money is desirable.
• The preference between (x,t) and (y,t + 1) is independent of
t.
• Continuity.
1. Deﬁne formally the continuity assumption for this context.
2. Show that the preference relation has a utility representation.
3. Verify that the preference relation represented by the utility
function u(x)δt (with δ<1 and u continuous and increasing)
satisﬁes the above properties.
4. Formulizeaconcept“onepreferencerelationismoreimpatient
than another.”
5. Discuss the claim that preferences represented by u1(x)δt
1 are
more impatient than preferences represented by u2(x)δt
2 if and
only if δ1 <δ 2.
Problem 6 (Tel Aviv 2003)
Consider the following consumer problem. There are two goods, 1
and 2. The consumer has a certain endowment. Before the con-
sumer are two “exchange functions”: he can exchange x units ofOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 143 Page number 127
Review Problems 127
good 1 for f (x) units of good 2, or he can exchange y units of good
2 for g(y) units of good 1. Assume the consumer can only make one
exchange.
1. Show that if the exchange functions are continuous and the
consumer’s preference relation satisﬁes monotonicity and con-
tinuity, then a solution to the consumer problem exists.
2. Explain why strong convexity of the preference relation is not
sufﬁcient to guarantee a unique solution if the functions f and
g are increasing and convex.
3. What does the statement “the function f is increasing and con-
vex” mean?
4. Suppose both functions f and g are differentiable and concave
and that the product of their derivatives at point 0 is 1. Sup-
pose also that the preference relation is strongly convex. Show
that under these conditions, the agent will not ﬁnd two dif-
ferent exchanges, one exchanging good 1 for good 2, and one
exchanging good 2 for good 1, optimal.
5. Now assume f (x) = ax and g(y) = by. Explain this assumption.
Find a condition that will ensure it is not proﬁtable for the
consumer to make more than one exchange.
Problem 7 (Tel Aviv 1999)
Consider a consumer in a world with K goods and preferences satis-
fying the standard assumptions regarding the consumer. At the start
of trade, the consumer is endowed with a bundle of goods e and he





The consumer’s preference over bundles of goods can be represented





1. ExplainthemeaningofthefunctionV andshowthatV(tp,e) =
V(p,e) where t is any positive number.
2. Show that for every bundle e, the set of vectors p, such that
V(p,e) is less than or equal to V(p∗,e), is convex.
3. Fix all prices but pi, and all quantities in the initial bundle but
wi. Show that the slope of the indifference curve of V in the
two-dimensional space where the parameters on the axes are
pi, and wi is (xi(p,w) − wi)/pi where x(p,w) is the solution to
the consumer’s problem B(p,w).October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 144 Page number 128
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Problem 8 (Tel Aviv 1998)
A consumer with wealth w = 10 “must” obtain a book from one of
threestores. Denotethepricesateachstoreasp1,p2,p3. Allpricesare
below w in the relevant range. The consumer has devised a strategy:
he compares the prices at the ﬁrst two stores and obtains the book
from the ﬁrst store if its price is not greater than the price at the
second store. If p1 > p2, he compares the prices of the second and
third stores and obtains the book from the second store if its price is
not greater than the price at the third store. He uses the remainder
of his wealth to purchase other goods.
1. What is this consumer’s “demand function”?
2. Does this consumer satisfy “rational man” assumptions?
3. Considerthefunctionv(p1,p2,p3) = w − pi∗,wherei∗ isthestore
from which the consumer purchases the book if the prices are
(p1,p2,p3). What does this function represent?
4. Explain why v(·) is not monotonically decreasing in pi. Com-
pare with the indirect utility function of the classic consumer
model.
Problem 9 (Tel Aviv 1999)
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) report the following experiment:










a. A sure proﬁt of $240.
b. A lottery between a proﬁt of $1000 with probability 25% and
0 with probability 75%.
c. A sure loss of $750.
d. A lottery between a loss of $1000 with probability 75% and 0
with probability 25%.
The participant will receive the sum of the outcomes of the two
lotteries he chooses. Seventy-three percent of participants chose
the combination a and d. What do you make of this result?
Problem 10 (Princeton 2000)
Consider the following social choice problem: a group has n mem-
bers (n is odd) who must choose from a set containing 3 elementsOctober 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 145 Page number 129
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{A,B,L}, where A and B are prizes and L is the lottery which yields
each of the prizes A and B with equal probability. Each member
has a strict preference over the three alternatives that satisﬁes vNM
assumptions. Show that there is a non-dictatorial social welfare
function which satisﬁes the independence of irrelevant alternatives
axiom (even the strict version I∗) and the Pareto axiom (Par). Rec-
oncile this fact with Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.
Problem 11 (Tel Aviv 2003. Based on Gilboa and Schmeidler 1995.)
An agent must decide whether to do something, Y, or not to do
it, N.
A history is a sequence of results for past events in which the agent
chose Y; each result is either a success S or a failure F. For example,
(S,S,F,F,S) is a history with ﬁve events in which the action was
carried out. Two of them (events 3 and 4) ended in failure while the
rest were successful.
The decision rule D is a function that assigns the decision Y or N
to every possible history.
Consider the following properties of decision rules:
• A1 After every history that contains only successes, the de-
cision rule will dictate Y, and after every history that contains
only failures, the decision rule will dictate N.
• A2 If the decision rule dictates a certain action following
some history, it will dictate the same action following any his-
torythatisderivedfromtheﬁrsthistorybyreorderingitsmem-
bers. For example, D(S,F,S,F,S) = D(S,S,F,F,S).
• A3I f D(h) = D(h ), then this will also be the decision follow-
ing the concatenation of h and h . (Reminder: The concatena-
tion of h = (F,S) and h  = (S,S,F) is (F,S,S,S,F)).
1. Foreveryi = 1,2,3, giveanexampleofadecisionrulethatdoes
not fulﬁll property Ai but does fulﬁll the other two properties.
2. Give an example of a decision rule that fulﬁlls all three prop-
erties.
3. (Difﬁcult) Characterize the decision rules that fulﬁll the three
properties.October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 146 Page number 130October 21, 2005 12:18 master Sheet number 147 Page number 131
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